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Abstract 
Financial contagion refers to a scenario in which small shocks, which initially affect 
only a few financial institutions or a particular region of the economy, spread to the 
rest of the financial sector and other countries whose economies were previously 
healthy. This resembles the “transmission” of a medical disease. Financial contagion 
happens both at domestic level and international level. At domestic level, usually the 
failure of a domestic bank or financial intermediary triggers transmission by 
defaulting on inter-bank liabilities, selling assets in a fire sale, and undermining 
confidence in similar banks. An example of this phenomenon is the failure of Lehman 
Brothers and the subsequent turmoil in the US financial markets. International 
financial contagion happens in both advanced economies and developing economies, 
and is the transmission of financial crises across financial markets. Within the current 
globalise financial system, with large volumes of cash flow and cross-regional 
operations of large banks and hedge funds, financial contagion usually happens 
simultaneously among both domestic institutions and across countries. 
There is no conclusive definition of financial contagion, most research papers 
study contagion by analyzing the change in the variance-covariance matrix during the 
period of market turmoil. King and Wadhwani (1990) first test the correlations 
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between the US, UK and Japan, during the US stock market crash of 1987. Boyer 
(1997) finds significant increases in correlation during financial crises, and reinforces 
a definition of financial contagion as a correlation changing during the crash period. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) give a definition of financial contagion. In their work, the 
term interdependence is used as the alternative to contagion. They claim that for the 
period they study, there is no contagion but only interdependence. Interdependence 
leads to common price movements during periods both of stability and turmoil.  
In the past two decades, many studies (e.g. Kaminsky et at., 1998; Kaminsky 
1999) have developed early warning systems focused on the origins of financial crises 
rather than on financial contagion. Further authors (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; 
Caporale et al, 2005), on the other hand, have focused on studying contagion or 
interdependence.  
In this thesis, an overall mechanism is proposed that simulates characteristics 
of propagating crisis through contagion. Within that scope, a new co-evolutionary 
market model is developed, where some of the technical traders change their 
behaviour during crisis to transform into herd traders making their decisions based on 
market sentiment rather than underlying strategies or factors. The thesis focuses on 
the transformation of market interdependence into contagion and on the contagion 
 12 
 
effects. The author first build a multi-national platform to allow different type of 
players to trade implementing their own rules and considering information from the 
domestic and a foreign market. Traders’ strategies and the performance of the 
simulated domestic market are trained using historical prices on both markets, and 
optimizing artificial market’s parameters through immune - particle swarm 
optimization techniques (I-PSO). The author also introduces a mechanism 
contributing to the transformation of technical into herd traders. A generalized auto-
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity - copula (GARCH-copula) is further applied 
to calculate the tail dependence between the affected market and the origin of the 
crisis, and that parameter is used in the fitness function for selecting the best solutions 
within the evolving population of possible model parameters, and therefore in the 
optimization criteria for contagion simulation. The overall model is also applied in 
predictive mode, where the author optimize in the pre-crisis period using data from 
the domestic market and the crisis-origin foreign market, and predict in the crisis 
period using data from the foreign market and predicting the affected domestic market. 
 13 
 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
A series of financial crises, such as the Mexican crisis of 1987, the Asian turmoil of 
1997, and the Russian instability of 1998, all share a common feature – problems 
spread from one country to neighbouring countries, and even regionally or globally. 
The spread is due to the cross-market linkages. If the cross-market linkages stay stable 
then the crisis is transferred through interdependence, and the recovery follows the 
recovery of the underlying economic reasons in the country of origin. When the cross-
market linkages get destabilized due to the crisis, then the crisis starts “feeding on 
itself” and the recovery of the underlying economic reason is not sufficient to get 
control of the crisis; a more comprehensive strategy with international involvement is 
required. The second type of crisis exhibits the phenomenon called ‘financial 
contagion’.  
There is no conclusive definition of financial contagion, most research papers 
study contagion by analyzing the change in the variance-covariance matrix during the 
period of market turmoil. King and Wadhwani (1990) first test the correlations 
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between the US, UK and Japan, during the US stock market crash in 1987. Boyer 
(1997) finds significant increases in correlation during financial crises, and reinforces 
a definition of financial contagion as a correlation breakdown during the crash period. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define financial contagion as “a significant increase in 
cross-market linkages after a shock to a group of countries”. They claim that for the 
period they study, there is no contagion but only interdependence. Interdependence 
leads to common price movements during periods both of stability and turmoil.  
In the past two decades, many studies (e.g. Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky 
1999) have developed early warning systems focused on the origins of financial crises 
rather than on financial contagion. Further authors (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; 
Caporale et al, 2005), on the other hand, have focused on studying contagion or 
interdependence. In this thesis, the author simulates the transmission of financial 
crises, modelling through computational intelligence the behaviour of market players 
and their various strategies. 
Computational intelligence combines elements of learning, adaptation, and 
evolution. In this thesis the author choose to use a hybrid computational approach 
involving artificial immune–particle swarm intelligence, genetic programming, and a 
mixed-game, to implement the challenging task of developing a system capable of 
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simulating realistic market behaviour and the contagion phenomenon. In the next 
section, the author will discuss the application of computational intelligence 
approaches in the area of finance. 
1.2. Structure of Thesis 
In Chapter 2, the author introduce the origin, development, and applications to finance 
of different evolutionary computing approaches. The reason for considering these in 
detail is the conclusion the author reach in the previous section here that evolutionary 
computing is the most representative computational intelligence area with financial 
applications. The model the author develops later in the thesis is also based on a 
hybrid evolutionary approach.  
In chapter 3, the author will briefly discuss the correlation coefficient as a 
measure of dependence between two random variables, and the limitations of this 
measure. Then, the author will introduce the copula as an alternative measure, 
together with a discussion of copula types and how their parameters are estimated. 
The reason for focusing on an effective measure of market interdependence is to be 
able to introduce that in the objective function of the optimization approach. An 
effective measure of interdependence also contributes to recognizing the shift towards 
 16 
 
contagion between markets. 
In chapter 4, the author develop a comprehensive market model comprising four 
types of traders: technical, game, herd, and noise traders, respectively. Then, the 
author extend this one-market model to an international two-market model, in order to 
explore how financial contagion happens. This is achieved by evolving the two-
market model and observing the interactions between the markets. The two-market 
model is extendible to a multi-national market, i.e. a multiple-market model. 
In chapter 5, the author propose an Immune Particle Swarm Optimization 
(Immune-PSO) algorithm, which is combined with an Immune Clone Selection 
algorithm. The reason for developing these algorithms is to improve the optimization 
technique applied to the two-market (multiple-market) model. Within the new 
approach, several operators are performed – a clone copy, a clone hyper-mutation and 
a clone selection - during the evolutionary steps of the model. The author also 
compare, on a set of test functions, the performance of the new approach with the 
genetic algorithm used in the previous chapter. Finally, the Immune-PSO is 
implemented to estimate the parameters of our agent-based multinational market 
model. 
 17 
 
In chapter 6, the author further modifies the co-evolutionary market model by 
introducing a mechanism allowing for some of the technical and game traders to 
transform their behaviour during crisis periods. Thus, during crises they will make 
their decisions based on market sentiment rather than following their usual trading 
strategies.  
In chapter 7, the author draw up and summarize the conclusions of this study. The 
main contributions are highlighted, and directions for further research are proposed. 
. 
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Chapter 2 : Nature-inspired Computational 
Approaches: Origin, Development and Applications 
to Finance 
 
Nature-inspired Computing is a collection of nature-inspired analytical and 
optimization tools. The systems resulting from the implementation of these techniques 
are better able to cope with complex problems.  
Evolutionary computing (EC) is the most representative computational 
intelligence area with financial applications. The model the author develop later in the 
thesis is also based on a hybrid evolutionary approach. According to Isasi et al. (2007), 
EC is divided into four main areas: evolutionary programming (EP), evolutionary 
strategies (ES), genetic algorithms (GA) and genetic programming (GP). They have 
been developed independently, where EP focuses on optimizing continuous functions 
without recombination, ES focus on optimizing continuous functions with 
recombination, GA focus on optimizing general combinatorial problems, and GP 
evolves programs, (Forrest 1993, Holland 1975, Michalewicz 1996).  
 19 
 
Along with the earlier established areas of EP, ES, GA and GP, the author also 
review here the recently developed artificial immune systems (AIS) and swarm 
intelligence (SI) approaches and their applications to finance. These latter techniques 
are also nature-inspired, and particularly relevant to the algorithm the author design 
and implement. Artificial Immune is adaptive systems, which are inspired by 
theoretical immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models, and 
then applied to problem solving. The techniques are inspired by specific 
immunological theories that explain the function and behaviour of the mammalian 
adaptive. (Castro et al., 2002) Swarm intelligence describes the collective behaviour 
of decentralized, self-organized systems, where interactions between agents lead to 
the emergence of "intelligent" global behaviour, (Beni and Wang, 1989). Examples of 
SI include ant colony optimization (ACO) and particle swarm optimization (PSO), 
(Dorigo, 1992; Eberhart& Kennedy, 1995).  
All of these approaches are widely used in various areas such as chemical 
industry, power system, machine design, robotic design, signal processing, biology, 
operational research, system identification, optimal control, learning, prediction, and 
fault diagnosis. Each of them has been also successfully applied to the area of finance 
and economics. The author will focus on four techniques in this chapter, directly 
relevant to our research, namely, GA, GP, PSO and AIS. 
 20 
 
2.0. Overview of Applications of Computational Intelligence Approaches to 
Financial Problems 
Financial markets, as highly nonlinear dynamic systems, are affected by many 
fundamental and sentiment factors, including interest rates, inflation rates, and 
political issues. Having the interdependency between the factors, it is difficult to 
model stock price movements with traditional methods. Computational intelligence 
approaches (CI), as a more powerful framework for dealing with complex problems, 
are being introduced to financial analysis.  Currently, applications of CI are 
increasingly covering various aspects of finance and economics. The range of 
techniques includes the main CI areas - artificial neural networks (ANN), 
evolutionary computing (EC), and fuzzy logic -as well as the more specific swarm 
intelligence technologies, support vector machines, and simulated annealing (SA), to 
name a few. 
Evolutionary approaches have been applied to problems in finance for a 
considerable time now. Bauer (1994) uses genetic algorithms (GA) based intelligent 
systems to find out effective market timing strategies. Allen and Karjalainen (1995) 
use GAs to identify profitable trading rules for the S&P 500 index using daily prices 
from 1928 to 1995. Chen and Yeh (1996) use genetic programming (GP) to prove the 
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efficient market hypothesis, namely, to formalize the notion that stock price is 
unpredictable. Mahfoud and Mani (1996) introduce a GA-based system to forecast 
share price. Neely et al. (1997) apply a GP-based model to predict foreign exchange 
rates and the result is reported as a success. Li and Tsang (1999) develop a financial 
genetic programming technique (FGP), and the result indicates that FGP outperforms 
random walk. 
Regarding the application of evolutionary strategies (ES), Streichert (2002) uses 
ES to discover technical trading rules. In recent years, evolutionary strategies have 
been used, in combination with other approaches. Hong (2007) proposes an integrated 
model of support vector regression (SVR) and ES. With ES, the problem of 
determining the parameters for SVR is resolved. The model overcomes the 
disadvantage of traditional time series forecasting, which has problems capturing the 
nonlinear patterns. Experimental results show that the proposed model outperforms 
other approaches that have been applied for exchange rate forecasting. Mora (2008) 
uses a self-organizing map (SOM) to reduce the dimensions of the prediction problem. 
In this model, the capability of GP is merged with ES, to generate classification trees. 
The result indicates that the model outperforms an evolutionary ANN method. Fan et 
al (2008) propose a real-valued quantum-inspired evolutionary strategy (QIES). This 
model is similar to estimation of distribution algorithms (EDAs). They also compare 
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the results with those from a canonical GA. The results are reported to be robust and 
also suggest a good potential for high-dimensional optimization. 
ANNs, nearly as popular as EC, are also powerful techniques to employ and are 
now widely used in the area of finance. Kimoto and Asakawa (1990) produce a timing 
prediction system for sale and purchase, based on modular neural networks for stocks 
on the Tokyo stock exchange. The authors claim that their model achieves accurate 
predictions. Yoon and Swales (1991) examine the capability of ANN, and compare it 
with other techniques such as multiple discriminate analyses. Results indicate that 
ANN enhances investors’ forecasting ability. Aiken and Bsat (1994) apply ANNs to 
the area of real estate. Yao and Poh (1995) use back-propagation neural networks to 
predict movements in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), and report a 
significant profit. Harrald and Kamstra (1997) conduct GP experiments to evolve 
ANNs to forecast stock price volatility. Lee (2001) adopts ANN to identify stock 
price trends. Chang (2004) proposes an integrated ANN and auto-regressive 
integrated moving average model to forecast the future fluctuation of the stock market 
index. The author concludes, however, that due to the noise and complexity, and the 
dimensionality of stock price, all those models have their inherent limitations. In other 
words, the input variables interfere with each other; hence the results are not 
convincing. 
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Furthermore, fuzzy logic is also popular in the financial arena but is often 
combined with other techniques. Wang et al (1998) propose an integrated model 
which combines GA with fuzzy knowledge. This model can integrate multiple fuzzy 
rule sets and their membership functions. Results show that their approach 
outperforms every individual knowledge base. Larsen and Yager (2000) present a 
hybrid soft computing technique for automated stock market forecasting and trend 
analysis. Firstly, they use principal component analysis to initiate the input data. Then, 
they use a neuro-fuzzy system to analyze the trend of stock prices. Lee (2001) 
suggests a Takagi-Sugeno-Kang (TSK) fuzzy rule-based system. In this model, a 
technical index is used as the input variable. The result, which is a linear combination 
of input variables, is tested on Taiwanese electronic shares from the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange (TSE). It is reported that the model can successfully forecast the price 
variation for stocks. Serguieva and Kalganova (2002) build a fuzzu-neuro-
evolutionary classifier of risky investments. Due to the complexity of the problem 
they tackle, an evolutionary strategy is applied using bidirectional incremental 
evolution (BIE) to evolve a fuzzy network. The model is tested with data on UK 
companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. Kuzemin and Lyashenko (2007) 
propose a fuzzy set theory approach which is used as the basis for analysis of 
financial flows in the economic security system. Qin and Li (2008) formulate a 
 24 
 
European option-pricing formula for fuzzy financial markets, and discuss some of 
their mathematical properties.  
From the above review of literature, the author can see that application of 
computational intelligence approaches in the financial area mainly include processing 
and analyzing financial data (financial forecasting), pricing complex financial 
products (securities pricing), and analyzing market behaviour (trading strategy 
generation). Evolutionary computing is the most representative of the computational 
intelligence approaches, and can successfully provide agents with learning capability. 
In the next chapter, the author will focus on the application of evolutionary computing 
in the area of finance. 
2.1. Genetic Algorithms 
Holland called his method a genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975). Genetic algorithms 
are categorized as global search heuristics. They are implemented in computer 
simulations where a population of abstract representations, called chromosomes, of 
candidate solutions to an optimization problem evolves towards better solutions. 
Traditionally, solutions are represented binary as strings of 0s and 1s, but other 
encodings are also possible. (Vajedia 2003) In each generation, the fitness of every 
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individual in the population is evaluated and multiple individuals are selected from 
the current population based on their fitness. The best chromosomes are picked to be 
parents for the next generation. Then new child chromosomes are generated, e.g. 
representing new trading strategies, by crossover (setting points and exchanging the 
genes in the chromosomes between the points) and mutation (randomly changing one 
gene at a given point). Finally, the poorest strategies are replaced by the new child 
strategies. The new population is then used in the next iteration of the algorithm. 
Commonly, the algorithm terminates when either a maximum number of generations 
has been produced, or a satisfactory fitness level has been reached for the population. 
The process is illustrated in Figure 2-1 below. 
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Figure 2-1: GA flowchart 
2.1.1. Population Representation and Initialization 
GAs operates on a number of potential solutions, called a population, consisting of 
some encoding of the parameter set simultaneously. Typically, a population is 
composed of between 30 and 100 individuals, although, a variant called the micro GA 
uses very small populations, less than 10 individuals, with a restrictive reproduction 
and replacement strategy in an attempt to reach real-time execution (Karr, 1991). In 
this thesis, micro GA is used due to the complexity of our agent based model .The 
most commonly used representation of chromosomes in the GA is that of the single-
level binary string. Here, each decision variable in the parameter set is encoded as a 
binary string and these are concatenated to form a chromosome. Whilst binary-coded 
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GAs are most commonly used, there is an increasing interest in alternative encoding 
strategies, such as integer and real-valued representations. 
The use of real-valued genes in GAs is claimed by Wright (1991) to offer a 
number of advantages in numerical function optimization over binary encodings. 
Efficiency of the GA is increased as there is no need to convert chromosomes to 
phenotypes before each function evaluation; less memory is required as efficient 
floating-point internal computer representations can be used directly; there is no loss 
in precision by discretisation to binary or other values; and there is greater freedom to 
use different genetic operators. Having decided on the representation, the first step in 
the SGA is to create an initial population. This is usually achieved by generating the 
required number of individuals using a random number generator that uniformly 
distributes numbers in the desired range. For example, with a binary population of 
Nind individuals whose chromosomes are Lind bits long, Nind× Lind random 
numbers uniformly distributed from the set {0, 1} would be produced.  
2.1.2. Objective and Fitness Functions 
The objective function is used to provide a measure of how individuals have 
performed in the problem domain. In the case of a minimization problem, the fittest 
individuals will have the lowest numerical value of the associated objective function. 
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This raw measure of fitness is usually only used as an intermediate stage in 
determining the relative performance of individuals in a GA. Another function, the 
fitness function, is normally used to transform the objective function value into a 
measure of relative fitness (De Jong, 1975), thus 
F (x) = g (f (x) )                                                                                               (2.1) 
where f is the objective function, g transforms the value of the objective function to a 
non-negative number and F is the resulting relative fitness. 
2.1.3. Fitness Calculation 
(i). Proportional fitness assignment 
A commonly used transformation is that of proportional fitness assignment. The 
individual fitness, 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  of each individual is computed as the individual’s raw 
performance, 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), relative to the whole population, i.e. 
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1        ,                                                                            (2.2) 
where Nis the population size and xi is the phenotypic value of individual i. Whilst 
this fitness assignment ensures that each individual has a probability of reproducing 
according to its relative fitness, it fails to account for negative objective function 
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values. 
(ii). Rank-based fitness assignment 
In rank-based fitness assignment, the population is sorted according to the objective 
values. The fitness assigned to each individual depends only on its position in the 
individuals rank and not on the actual objective value. Rank-based fitness assignment 
overcomes the scaling problems of the proportional fitness assignment. The 
reproductive range is limited, so that no individuals generate an excessive number of 
offspring. Ranking introduces a uniform scaling across the population and provides a 
simple and effective way of controlling selective pressure. Rank-based fitness 
assignment behaves in a more robust manner than proportional fitness assignment and, 
thus, is the method of choice. (Bäck, T. &Hoffmeister, 1991) 
(iii). Linear ranking 
Consider Nind as the number of individuals in the population, Pos as the position of 
an individual in this population (the least fit individual has Pos=1, the fittest 
individual Pos=Nind) and SPas the selective pressure. The fitness value for an 
individual is calculated as: 
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𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹) = 2 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 2 ∗ (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 1) ∗ (𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹−1)(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 −1)   (2.3) 
Linear ranking allows values of selective pressure in [1.0, 2.0]. 
Riechmann (2000) linked the theory of genetic algorithm learning to evolutionary 
game theory and showed that economic learning via genetic algorithms can be 
described as a specific form of an evolutionary game. In that paper the fitness is 
defined as: 
Fitness=agent’s quantity ∙(price-unit costs)        (2.4) 
The quantity the agent supplies reflects their own strategy, the market price reflects 
the state of the whole population, which means, given total demand, it reflects 
aggregate supply, i.e. the sum of all individual supply strategies. The total supply has 
an important influence on each agent’s fitness. 
2.1.4. Selection 
Selection is the process of determining the number of times, or trials, a particular 
individual are chosen for reproduction and, thus, the number of offspring that an 
individual will produce. (Baker, 1987) 
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(i). Roulette wheel selection 
The simplest selection scheme is roulette-wheel selection, also called stochastic 
sampling with replacement (Baker, 1987). This is a stochastic algorithm and involves 
the following technique. The individuals are mapped to contiguous segments of a line, 
such that each individual's segment is equal in size to its fitness. A random number is 
generated and the individual whose segment spans the random number is selected. 
The process is repeated until the desired number of individuals is obtained (called 
mating population). This technique is analogous to a roulette wheel with each slice 
proportional in size to the fitness. 
Table 2-1 shows the selection probability for 11 individuals, linear ranking and 
selective pressure together with the fitness value. Individual 1 is the fittest individual 
and occupies the largest interval, whereas individual 10 as the second least fit 
individual has the smallest interval on the line. Individual 11, the least fit interval, has 
a fitness value of 0 and get no chance for reproduction. 
Table 2-1: Selection probability and fitness value 
Number of individual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
fitness value 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 
selection probability 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.0 
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For selecting the mating population, the appropriate number of uniformly distributed 
random numbers (uniformly distributed between 0.0 and 1.0) is independently 
generated. For example, for a sample of six random numbers: 
0.81, 0.32, 0.96, 0.01, 0.65, 0.42, 
Figure 2-2 shows the selection process of the individuals for the example in Table 
together with the above sample trials. 
 
Figure 2-2: Roulette-wheel selection 
After the selection, the mating population consists of the following individuals: 
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9. 
The roulette-wheel selection algorithm provides a zero bias but does not guarantee 
minimum spread. 
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(ii). Stochastic universal selection 
Stochastic universal sampling (Baker, 1987) provides zero bias and minimum spread. 
The individuals are mapped to contiguous segments of a line, such that each 
individual's segment is equal in size to its fitness exactly as in roulette-wheel selection. 
Here equally spaced pointers are placed over the line as many as there are individuals 
to be selected. Consider NPointer as the number of individuals to be selected, then the 
distance between the pointers is1/NPointer and the position of the first pointer is 
given by a randomly generated number in the range [0, 1/NPointer]. 
Thus for 6 individuals to be selected, the distance between the pointers is 
1/6=0.167. Figure 2-3 shows the selection for the above example, where 1 random 
number in the range [0, 0.167] is used: 
:  
Figure 2-3: Stochastic universal sampling 
After the selection, the mating population consists of the following individuals: 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8. 
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Stochastic universal sampling ensures a selection of offspring which is closer to what 
is deserved then roulette wheel selection. 
2.1.5. Crossover  
The basic operator for producing new chromosomes in GA is that of crossover. 
Like its counterpart in nature, crossover produces new individuals that have some 
parts of both parent’s genetic material.  
(i).Single-point crossover 
The simplest form of crossover is that of single-point crossover, see below: 
 
Figure 2-4: Single-point crossover 
(ii). Multi-point crossover 
For multi-point crossover, the bits between successive crossover points are 
exchanged between the two parents to produce two new offspring. The section 
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between the first allele position and the first crossover point is not exchanged between 
individuals. This process is illustrated in Figure 2-5 bellow: 
 
Figure 2-5: Multi-point Crossover 
The idea behind multi-point, and indeed many of the variations on the crossover 
operator, is that the parts of the chromosome representation that contribute most to the 
performance of a particular individual may not necessarily be contained in adjacent 
substrings (Booker, 1987). Further, the disruptive nature of multi-point crossover 
appears to encourage the exploration of the search space, rather than favoring the 
convergence to highly fit individuals early in the search, thus making the search more 
robust (Spears & De Jong, 1991).  
(iii). Uniform Crossover 
Single and multi-point crossover defines cross points as places between loci 
where a chromosome can be split. Uniform crossover (Syswerda, 1989) generalises 
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this scheme to make every locus a potential crossover point. A crossover mask, the 
same length as the chromosome structures is created at random and the parity of the 
bits in the mask indicates which parent will supply the offspring with which bits. 
Consider the following two parents, crossover mask and resulting offspring:   
P1 = 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
P2 = 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Mask = 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
O1 = 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
O2 = 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Here, the first offspring, O1, is produced by taking the bit from P1 if the 
corresponding mask bit is 1 or the bit from P2 if the corresponding mask bit is 0. 
Offspring O2 is created using the inverse of the mask or, equivalently, swapping P1 
and P2. Uniform crossover, like multi-point crossover, has been claimed to reduce the 
bias associated with the length of the binary representation used and the particular 
coding for a given parameter set.  
(iv). Intermediate Recombination 
Given a real-valued encoding of the chromosome structure, intermediate 
recombination is a method of producing new phenotypes around and between the 
values of the parents’ phenotypes (Mühlenbein & Schlierkamp-Voosen, 1993). 
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Offspring are produced according to the rule, where α is a scaling factor chosen 
uniformly at random over some interval, typically [-0.25, 1.25] and P1 and P2 are the 
parent chromosomes. Each variable in the offspring is the result of combining the 
variables in the parents according to the following expression with a new α chosen for 
each pair of parent genes.  
O1 = P1 × α (P2 − P1)                                                                                 (2.5) 
(v). Linear Order Crossover 
Linear Order Crossover was first proposed by Falkenauer & Bouffouix (1991). It is 
implemented as follows: 
Step 1: Randomly select a subsequence of genes from one of the two parent 
chromosomes and copy it into a new offspring maintaining the position of the 
subsequence.  
Step 2: Cross out the genes in the selected subsequence of Step 1 from the 
second parent. Then place the remaining genes of the second parent from left to right 
in the child's chromosome around the already inserted subsequence. This completes 
one offspring. 
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 Step 3: Repeat Steps1and2, but reverse the roles of the two parents.  
Matta (2009) uses GA to solve multiprocessor open shop scheduling problem which is 
categorized as a hard combinatorial optimization problem. In that paper he uses 
Linear Order Crossover. 
 
Figure 2-6: Example of two parent chromosomes 
 
Figure 2-7: Illustrative example of crossover 
Consider the two parent chromosomes shown in Figure 2-6. The sub-sequence 
from (5, 2) to (2, 3) of parent1 was randomly selected to be copied directly into the 
offspring. Figure 2-7 illustrates the creation of an offspring. The selected subsequence 
of parent1 is directly placed into the same position in the offspring and the other 
genes of parent2 are placed around this subsequence, forming a feasible offspring. 
This process is repeated with the parent roles reversed to create a second offspring. 
2.1.6. Mutation 
In natural evolution, mutation is a random process where one allele of a gene is 
replaced by another to produce a new genetic structure. In GAs, mutation is randomly 
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applied with low probability, typically in the range 0.001 to0.01, and modifies 
elements in the chromosomes. Usually considered as a background operator, the role 
of mutation is often seen as providing a guarantee that the probability of searching 
any given string will never be zero and acting as a safety net to recover good genetic 
material that may be lost through the action of selection and crossover (Goldberg, 
1989). The effect of mutation on a binary string is illustrated bellow: 
 
Figure 2-8: Single point mutation 
Many variations on the mutation operator have been proposed. For example, 
biasing the mutation towards individuals with lower fitness values to increase the 
exploration in the search without losing information from the fitter individuals (Davis, 
1989) or parameterising the mutation such that the mutation rate decreases with the 
population convergence (Fogarty,1989). Mühlenbein & Schlierkamp-Voosenhas 
(1993) introduced a mutation operator for the real-coded GA that uses a non-linear 
term for the distribution of the range of mutation applied to gene values. It is claimed 
0001 100000 
0000 100000 
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that by biasing mutation towards smaller changes in gene values, mutation can be 
used in conjunction with recombination as a foreground search process.  
2.1.7. Termination of GA 
Because the GA is a stochastic search method, it is difficult to formally specify 
convergence criteria. As the fitness of a population may remain static for a number of 
generations before a superior individual is found, the application of conventional 
termination criteria becomes problematic. A common practice is to terminate the GA 
after a pre-specified number of generations and then test the quality of the best 
members of the population against the problem definition. If no acceptable solutions 
are found, the GA may be restarted or a fresh search initiated.  
2.1.8. Applications 
Genetic algorithms have been widely applied in various areas. For example, 
Charbonneau (1995) suggests that GA are useful for problems in astrophysics and 
applies them to three specific problems: fitting the rotation curve of a galaxy based on 
observed rotational velocities of its components, determining the pulsation period of a 
variable star based on time-series data, and deriving the critical parameters in a 
magneto hydrodynamic model of the solar wind. Obayashi et al. (2000) uses a 
multiple-objective genetic algorithm to design the wing shape for a supersonic aircraft. 
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Sato et al. (2002) use genetic algorithms to design a concert hall with optimal acoustic 
properties, maximizing the sound quality for the audience, for the conductor, and for 
the musicians on stage. The authors state that these solutions have proportions similar 
to Vienna's Grosser Musikvereinsaal, whose acoustic properties are considered to be 
one of the best in the world.  
GA hasfurther been applied to financial problems. LeBaron (1999) proves that 
GA is a powerful method to locate improvement in complicated higher-dimension 
space, after a long discussion of the time series properties of an artificial stock market. 
Allen et al. (1999) use GA to learn technical trading rules for the S&P 500 index 
using daily price data from 1928-1995; the rules are able to identify the index when 
daily returns are positive and volatility is low.Mahfoud and Mani (1996) use a genetic 
algorithm to predict the future performance of 1600 publicly traded stocks. In their 
paper, GA are used to evolve a set of if/then rules to classify each stock and to 
provide, as output, both a recommendation on what to do with regards to that stock 
(buy, sell, or no prediction) and a numerical forecast of the relative return. The results 
are compared to those of an established neural net-based system, used to forecast 
stock prices and manage portfolios for three years. Overall, the genetic algorithm 
significantly outperforms the neural network. Similar success was achieved by 
Andreou, Georgopoulos and Likothanassis(2002), who used hybrid genetic algorithms 
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to evolve neural networks that predicted the exchange rates of foreign currencies up to 
one month ahead. GA clearly outperforms the other methods. More recent 
applications of GA include Chun-Teck Lye (2011) which presents a hybrid approach 
by associating GA and Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) to improve the 
Stutzer Index optimization. 
2.2. Genetic Programming 
Genetic programming is another of the EC approaches and focuses on finding 
computer programs that perform a user-defined task (Banzhaf 1998). The first 
statement of modern "tree-based" GP, that is procedural languages organized in tree-
based structures and operated on by suitably defined genetic operators, is given by 
Michael Cramer (1985). That work is later greatly expanded by John Koza, a main 
proponent of GP, who has pioneered the application of genetic programming in 
various complex optimization and search problems (Koza, 1990). GP is a 
specialization of GA where each individual is a computer program. The fitness 
landscape of GP is determined by a program’s ability to perform a given 
computational task. The population of computer programs is optimized according to 
fitness. Thus GP evolves computer programs represented in memory as tree structures. 
Trees can be easily evaluated in a recursive manner. Every tree node has an operator 
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function and every terminal node has an operand, making mathematical expressions 
easy to evolve and evaluate.  
2.2.1. Solution Initialization 
The innovation of GP lies in the variable sized solution representation which requires 
efficient initial population construction, and this feature makes it different from other 
evolutionary algorithms. Individuals are represented as trees constructed randomly 
from a primitive set. This primitive set contains functions and terminals. A tree’s 
internal nodes are selected from the functions and leaf nodes are selected from the 
terminals. GP allows variety in composition of solution structures using same 
primitive set. Initialization plays an important role in success of an evolutionary 
algorithm. A poor initial population can cause any good algorithm to get stuck in local 
optima. On the other hand a good initialization can make most of the algorithms work 
sufficiently well. There are a few initialization techniques popular in tree based GP.  
(i). Full method  
The full method is very similar to the grow method except the terminals are 
guaranteed to be of a certain depth. This guarantee does not specify the number of 
nodes in an individual. This method requires a final depth, d. 
1. Every node, starting from the root, with a depth less than d, is made of a 
 44 
 
randomly selected function. If the node has a depth equal to d, the node is 
made of a randomly selected terminal.  
2. All functions have a number (equal to the arity of the function) of child nodes 
appended, and the algorithm starts again. Thus, only if d is specified as one, 
could this method produce a one-node tree.  
(ii). Grow method 
With this technique the entire population is created by using the grow method which 
creates one individual at a time. An individual created with this method may be a tree 
of any depth up to a specified maximum, m.  
1. Starting from the root of the tree every node is randomly chosen as either a 
function or terminal.  
2. If the node is a terminal, a random terminal is chosen.  
3. If the node is a function, a random function is chosen, and that node is given a 
number of children equal to the arity (number of arguments) of the function. 
For every one of the function’s children the algorithm starts again, unless the 
child is at depth m, in which case the child is made of a randomly selected 
terminal. This method does not guarantee individuals of a certain depth 
(although they will be no deeper than m). Instead it provides a range of 
structures throughout the population.  
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2.2.2. Selection 
The evolutionary operators are applied on individuals particularly selected for that 
operation. The individuals are selected using a particular selection mechanism. Two of 
such mechanisms are defined as follows.  
(i).Tournament selection  
In this type of selection, a tournament is conducted among few individuals chosen 
randomly from the population. The winner or best member is selected as a result of a 
tournament. The tournament size determines how many random members are selected 
for the tournament. Tournament size determines the selective pressure; large 
tournament size favours fitter solutions for selection. (Fang &Li, 2010) 
(ii). Fitness proportionate selection  
All the trees have probability of selection based upon their fitness. The probability of 
selection for a population of size ‘N’ is calculated as  
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                         (2.6) 
This is also called Roulette Wheel Selection mechanism. Several other selection 
mechanisms also exist in the literature like Rank Based Selection and Stochastic 
Universal Sampling. (Koza, 1997) 
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2.2.3. Crossover 
Crossover operator works by selecting two parents from the population. Two random 
subtrees are selected from each parent and swapped to create children. Advancements 
have been made to pure random crossover operator in order to make it more efficient 
and propagate good building blocks among generations. The information regarding 
size (Langdon, 2000), depth (Ito et al., 1998) or homogeneity (Langdon, 2000) of 
subtrees is also exploited while performing this operation.  
2.2.4. Mutation 
Mutation used in GP is of three types. In point mutation, a single node in a parent tree 
is selected and replaced with a random node of the same type. E.g. a function node is 
replaced by a function node of the same arity, and a terminal node is replaced by a 
randomly selected terminal node. (Koza, 1997) 
(i)Shrink mutation selects a node randomly and the subtree rooted at that node is 
replaced by a single terminal node. (Koza, 1997) 
(ii)Grow mutation selects a random node and a randomly generated subtree is 
replaced by the subtree rooted at that node. (Koza, 1997) 
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2.2.5. Reproduction 
In this operator an individual is selected and copied directly to the new generation 
without any changes or modifications to it. Koza (1997) allowed 10% of the 
population to reproduce. If the fitness test does not change, reproduction can have a 
significant effect on the total time required for GP because a reproduced individual 
will have an identical fitness score to that of its parent. Thus a reproduced individual 
does not need to be tested, as the result is already known. For Koza, this represented a 
10% reduction in the required time to fitness test a population. However, a fitness test 
that has a random component, which is effectively a test that does not initialise to 
exactly the same starting scenario, would not apply for this increase in efficiency. The 
selection of an individual to undergo reproduction is the responsibility of the selection 
function. 
2.2.6. Solution Fitness 
Fitness is the performance of an individual corresponding to the problem it is aimed to 
solve. It tells which elements or the regions of the search space are good. The fitness 
measure steers the evolutionary process towards better approximate solutions to the 
problem. Fitness of individuals in a population can be measured in many ways. It can 
be measure of error between the original and desired output of a solution. It can be 
compliance of the structure to the task based on a user specified criteria. The 
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difference between fitness evaluation in GP and other evolutionary algorithms is that 
each individual of GP is a program which needs recursive execution of the nodes of 
the tree in a precise manner. This adds an overhead to the algorithm, increasing its 
evolution time and required computational sources.  
2.2.7. Applications 
In 1990s, GP was mainly used to solve relatively simple problems because it is very 
computationally intensive. Recently it has produced many novel and outstanding 
results in areas such as quantum computing, electronic design, game playing, sorting, 
and searching, due to improvements in GP technology and the exponential growth in 
CPU power. For example, it has been used for novel designs such as patented antenna 
designs (Lohn et al., 2005), patented analogue electronic circuits (Koza et al., 2004), 
and a small molecule design (Nachbar, 2000). It is also being used commercially to 
characterize dynamic processes such as chemical processes (Hinchliffe et al., 1999), 
and image processing (Zhang, 2007). Further, Kishore et al. (2000) explore the 
feasibility of applying genetic GP to multi-category pattern classification problem, for 
the first time. GP can discover relationships among observed data and express them 
mathematically. In their paper, a methodology for GP-based n-class pattern 
classification is developed, and the reported results indicate a very good performance. 
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Genetic programming also has a rich history of applications in the area of finance. 
Chen and Yeh (1996) use GP to prove the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), namely, 
to formalize the notion that stock price is unpredictable. Chen (2000) proposes a new 
GP-based architecture to study artificial stock markets. In his model, a new concept, 
“business school”, is introduced. In essence, business school is a procedure to map the 
phenotype and genotype, and in the author’s words, “school is for discovering the 
secret of success”. Furthermore, traders’ search behaviour is also considered, and the 
result indicates that the return series is independently and identically distributed (iid), 
conforming to EMH. However, the authors claim that many of their traders are able 
quite often to find useful signals from the business school. Wilson and Banzhaf (2009) 
compare two GP approaches: a co-evolutionary genetic programming approach (PAM 
DGP) and a standard linear genetic programming (LGP), implemented for trading of 
stocks across market sectors. Both implementations are found to be impressively 
robust to market fluctuations while reacting efficiently to opportunities for profit, 
where PAM DGP proved slightly more reactive to market changes than LGP.  
Furthermore, Tsang et al. (2009) develop an artificial financial market and use it 
to model stock markets’ behaviour. The model introduces technical, fundamental and 
noise traders. Technical traders are sophisticated GP-based agents that co-evolve by 
forecasting investment opportunities using technical analysis. By identifying the 
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statistical properties of price series and introducing the “red queen principle” in 
evolution, they demonstrate that GP could play a key role in studying stock markets. 
Almanza et al. (2007) use a GP based repository method (RM) to find out significant 
movements in financial stock prices. Results show that the contribution of GP 
processing is very valuable to the performance of RM. Markose et al. (2001) develop 
and implement a financial genetic programming model (FGP) on intraday tick data for 
stock index options and futures arbitrage. This model is suitable for online trading 
when profitable window arbitrage opportunities exist, which range from one to ten 
minutes. This application indicates that FGP, in its interactive capacity, allows experts 
to channel their knowledge into machine discovery. 
2.3. Particle Swarm Optimization 
Particle swarm optimization is a population-based stochastic optimization technique 
developed by Eberhart and Kennedy in 1995, and inspired the by social behaviour of 
bird flocking or fish schooling. (Eberhart& Kennedy, 1995) PSO shares similarities 
with evolutionary techniques such as GA. The system is initialized with a population 
of random solutions, and searches for optima by updating successive generations. 
However unlike GA, PSO has no evolution operators such as crossover and mutation. 
In PSO, the potential solutions, called particles, fly through the problem space by 
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following the current optimum particles (Jaco&Schutte, 2005). Figure 2-9 below 
presents the flowchart . pseudo code for the overall PSO algorithm see appendix A 
 
Figure 2-9: PSO flowchart  
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Each particle keeps track of its coordinates in the problem space, which are associated 
with the best solution or fitness it has achieved so far, and the fitness value is also 
stored and called pbest (particle best). Another "best" value that is tracked by the 
particle swarm optimizer is the best value obtained so far by any particle within the 
neighbours of the particle, and this location is called lbest (local best). When a particle 
takes all the population as its topological neighbours, the best value is global and is 
called gbest (global best). The particle swarm optimization concept consists of, at each 
time step, changing the velocity of or accelerating randomly each particle toward its 
pbest and lbest locations, with separate random numbers being generated for 
acceleration toward the pbest and lbest locations (Jaco&Schutte, 2005). 
Standard Particle Swarm Optimization (SPSO) achieves optimization by means 
of cooperation and competition between individual members of the population. Each 
particle represents a possible solution to the problem. SPSO starts by initializing a 
group of solutions, and then finds the optimum solution through iteration. Each 
particle 𝑖𝑖 updates itself by tracing two “best values”: one is the best solution pbest 
found by the particle itself and denoted as 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  , and the other is the best solution gbest 
found by its neighbours and denoted as 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 . This process could be described 
mathematically as follows. In an n dimensional searching space, a population contains 
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m particles, 𝑋𝑋 = {𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2.⋯𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 } , where the position of particlei is 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ={𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2.⋯𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 }and its velocity is𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = {𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖1, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖2.⋯𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 }, while the local best solution is 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖1 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2 ,⋯𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 }  and the global best solution is 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 = {𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔1,𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔2,⋯𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹 } . A 
particle’s velocity and position are updated through the following formulas: 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗+1 = 𝑤𝑤𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑅𝑅1�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 � +  𝑐𝑐2𝑅𝑅2�𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 �,(2.7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗+1 =  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗+1       ,                                                (2.8) 
where 𝑁𝑁 = 1, 2 … .𝐹𝐹;  𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2 … .𝑚𝑚. Here 𝐹𝐹 is the dimension of the search space, 𝑚𝑚 is 
the population size, 𝑗𝑗  is the current generation, while 𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2  are the acceleration 
constants and 𝑅𝑅1 ,𝑅𝑅2 are uniformly distributed random numbers in the range from 0 
to 1. Also 𝑤𝑤 is the weight given to the extent to which the previous velocity affects 
the current velocity. The velocity is normally restricted within the 
interval[−𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥  , 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 ], and 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 = 𝑘𝑘 × 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥  where 0.1 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 1. 
2.3.1. Algorithms Refinement 
Clerc and Kennedy (2002) apply a constriction factor, v, to the new velocity  
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗+1 = 𝜒𝜒{𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑅𝑅1�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 � +  𝑐𝑐2𝑅𝑅2�𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 �}   ,       (2.9) 
𝜒𝜒 = 2|2−𝑐𝑐−√𝑐𝑐2−4𝑐𝑐|  where  c=𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑐𝑐2, c>4                                  (2.10) 
With this formulation, the velocity limit,𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 , is no longer necessary. A choice need 
not be made between constriction and inertia (𝑤𝑤); Eberhart and Shi (2000) show that 
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with judicious parameter settings (𝑤𝑤  set to 𝜒𝜒 , and 𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑐𝑐2 >4) the two approaches 
arealgebraically equivalent and improved performance could be achieved across a 
wide range of problems. 
Parsopoulos and Vrahatis (2004) modified the constricted algorithm to harness 
the explorative behaviour of global search and exploitative nature of a local 
neighbourhood scheme. To combine the two, two velocity updates are initially 
calculated: 
𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹+1 = 𝜒𝜒{𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑅𝑅1�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 � +  𝑐𝑐2𝑅𝑅2�𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 �}   (2.11) 
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹+1 = 𝜒𝜒{𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑅𝑅1′ �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 � +  𝑐𝑐2𝑅𝑅2′ �𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 �}     (2.12) 
 
where G and L are the global and local velocity updates respectively, 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔  is the global 
best particle position and 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙  is the particle’s local neighbourhood best particle position. 
These two updates are then combined to form a unified velocity update (U), which is 
then applied to the current position: 
𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹+1 = (1 − 𝑢𝑢)𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹+1 + 𝑢𝑢𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹+1𝑢𝑢 ∈ [0,1]                          (2.13) 
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹+1 = 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹+1(2.14) 
where u is a unification factor that balances the global and local aspects of the search 
and suggestions are given to add mutation style influences to each in turn. 
Experimentation was promising and further work has been carried out since for 
dynamic environments (Parsopoulos and Vrahatis 2005a, 2005b). 
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2.3.2. Applications 
PSO has been applied to a number of areas. Yuan et al. (2004) apply PSO topower 
systems, such as distribution system expansion planning, generator maintenance 
scheduling, unit commitment, load dispatch, optimal power flow calculation and 
optimal control of reactive power, harmonic analysis and capacitor configuration. 
They claim, through a thorough study of PSO, that its great latent capacity will be 
brought into play in the electricity market auction, bidding strategy, and electricity 
market simulation. Kannana et al. (2003) present the application of variants of the 
PSO technique to the expansion planning problem. The results obtained are compared 
with dynamic programming (DP) and show that PSO outperforms DP in terms of both 
speed and efficiency.  
PSO is also increasingly used in the area of finance. Nenortaite and Simutis 
(2004) present a decision-making method based on the application of neural networks 
and particle swarm techniques, which is used to generate one-step-ahead investment 
decisions. The experiments presented in the paper show that the application of their 
proposed method achieves better results than the market average. Kendall and Su 
(2005) apply PSO to the construction of optimal risky portfolios for financial 
investments. A particle swarm solver is developed and tested on various restricted and 
unrestricted risky investment portfolios. The particle swarm solver demonstrates high 
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computational efficiency in constructing optimal risky portfolios of less than fifteen 
assets. Kwok et al (2009) propose the use of PSO to determine the appropriate 
long/short durations, when optimizing the rules generated by technical traders to 
maximize trading profit. The results are verified as effective. Jha et al., (2009) apply 
PSO to pricing options. The results are compared with the classical Black-Scholes 
model for simple European options and indicate that PSO is the superior method. 
2.4. Artificial Immune Systems 
Artificial Immune Systems are adaptive systems, which are inspired by theoretical 
immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models, and then applied 
to problem solving (Castro et al., 2002). AIS is distinct from computational 
immunology and theoretical biology. These are rather concerned with simulating 
immunology using computational and mathematical models, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the immune system. Such models, though, first led to establishing 
AIS as a new field of study, and they continue to provide a fertile ground for 
inspiration. Finally, the field of AIS is not concerned with the investigation of the 
immune system as a substrate computation, such as DNA computing. 
AIS begin in the mid 1980s with Farmer, Packard and Perelson (1986) and 
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Bersini and Varela's papers on immune networks (1990). However, it is only in the 
mid 90s that AIS become a subject area in its own right. The common techniques are 
inspired by specific immunological theories that explain the function and behaviour of 
the mammalian adaptive. 
2.4.1. Clonal Selection Algorithm 
Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA) is a class of algorithms inspired by the clonal 
selection theory of acquired immunity, which explains how B and T lymphocytes 
improve their response to antigens over time. This is called “affinity maturation”. 
These algorithms focus on the Darwinian attributes of the theory where selection is 
inspired by the affinity of antigen-antibody interactions, reproduction is inspired by 
cell division, and variation is inspired by somatic hyper-mutation. (deCastro, Von, 
2002) Figure 2-4 below presents the flowchart and pseudo code for the overall CSA 
algorithm.  
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Figure 2-10: CSA flowchart
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2.4.2 Applications 
Clonal selection algorithms are most commonly applied to optimization and pattern 
recognition domains, some of which resemble parallel hill climbing and a genetic 
algorithm without the recombination operator, (deCastro and VonZuben, 2002). 
deCastro and VonZuben propose a powerful computational implementation of the 
clonal selection principle that explicitly takes into account the affinity maturation of 
the immune response. The algorithm is shown to be an evolutionary strategy capable 
of solving complex machine learning tasks, like pattern recognition and multimodal 
optimization. White and Garrett (2003) examine the clonal selection algorithm 
CLONALG and the suggestion that it is suitable for pattern recognition. CLONALG 
is tested over a series of binary character recognition tasks and its performance 
compared to a set of benchmark binary matching algorithms. A number of 
enhancements are made to the algorithm to improve its performance and the 
classification tests are repeated. Results show that given enough data, CLONALG can 
successfully classify previously unseen patterns and that adjustment to the existing 
algorithm can improve performance. Clonal selection algorithms haven’t been used in 
the area of finance up to date. But as an optimization technique, it could still be 
applied to optimise the parameters of finance models in theory. 
2.5. Game Theory 
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making. More formally, it is "the study 
of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational 
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decision-makers."(Roger 1991). 
2.5.1. Types of Games 
Nash equilibrium 
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed 
it) is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each 
player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no 
player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally. If each 
player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy 
while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices 
and the corresponding payoffs constitute Nash equilibrium. (Osborne & Ariel, 1994) 
Non-cooperative game and cooperative game 
In game theory, a non-cooperative game is one in which players make decisions 
independently. Thus, while they may be able to cooperate, any cooperation must be 
self-enforcing. A game in which players can enforce contracts through third parties is 
a cooperative game. (Harsanyi, John, 1974) 
Zero-sum game 
In game theory and economic theory, a zero-sum game is a mathematical 
representation of a situation in which a participant's gain (or loss) of utility is exactly 
balanced by the losses (or gains) of the utility of the other participant(s). If the total 
gains of the participants are added up, and the total losses are subtracted, they will 
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sum to zero. Thus cutting a cake, where taking a larger piece reduces the amount of 
cake available for others, is a zero-sum game if all participants value each unit of cake 
equally (see marginal utility). In contrast, non-zero-sum describes a situation in which 
the interacting parties' aggregate gains and losses are either less than or more than 
zero. A zero-sum game is also called a strictly competitive game while non-zero-sum 
games can be either competitive or non-competitive. (Ken 2007). 
The prisoner's dilemma is a canonical example of a game analyzed in game theory 
that shows why two individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in 
their best interest to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin 
Dresher working at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized the game with 
prison sentence payoffs and gave it the "prisoner's dilemma" name (Poundstone, 
1992). A classic example of the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is presented as follows: 
Two men are arrested, but the police do not possess enough information for a 
conviction. Following the separation of the two men, the police offer both a similar 
deal—if one testifies against his partner (defects/betrays), and the other remains silent 
(cooperates/assists), the betrayer goes free and the one that remains silent receives the 
full one-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to only one month in 
jail for a minor charge. If each testifies against the other, the other, each receives a 
three-month sentence. Each prisoner must choose either to betray or remain silent; the 
decision of each is kept quiet. What should they do? If it is supposed here that each 
player is only concerned with lessening his time in jail, the game becomes a non-zero 
sum game where the two players may either assists or betrays the other. In the game, 
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the sole worry of the prisoners seems to be increasing his reward. The interesting 
symmetry of this problem is that the logical decision leads each to betray the other, 
even though their individual ‘prize’ would be greater if they cooperated.(Osborne & 
Ariel 1994) 
 
Figure 2-11: Prisoners’ dilemma 
In the regular version of this game, collaboration is dominated by betrayal, and as a 
result, the only possible outcome of the game is for both prisoners to betray the other. 
Regardless of what the other prisoner chooses, one will always gain a greater payoff 
by betraying the other. Because betrayal is always more beneficial than cooperation, 
all objective prisoners would seemingly betray the other if operating purely rationally. 
However, in reality humans display a systematic bias towards cooperative behavior in 
Prisoner's dilemma and similar games, much more so than predicted by a theory based 
only on rational self interested action. (Ahn et al 2003) 
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2.5.2 Applications 
Shafer and Vovk（2008）use a game-theoretic framework for probability to derive a 
capital asset pricing model from an efficient market hypothesis, with no assumptions 
about the beliefs or preferences of investors. While efficient market hypothesis says 
that a speculator with limited means cannot beat a particular index by a substantial 
factor, the model they derive says that the difference between the average returns of a 
portfolio and the index should approximate the difference between the portfolio’s 
covariance with the index and the index’s variance. 
ItayandPauzner(2004) explore a model with two countries which might be subject 
to a self-fulfilling crisis, induced by agents withdrawing their investments in the fear 
that others will do so. While the fundamentals of the two countries are independent, 
the fact that they share the same group of investors may generate a contagion of crises. 
The realization of a crisis in one country reduces agents’ wealth and thus makes them 
more risk averse (they assume decreasing absolute risk aversion). This reduces their 
incentive to maintain their investments in the second country since doing so exposes 
them to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behaviour of other agents. 
Consequently, the probability of a crisis in the second country increases. This yields a 
positive correlation between the returns on investments in the two countries even 
though they are completely independent in terms of fundamentals.  
Dasgupt (2004) models financial contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon in a 
dynamic setting with coordinating game with incomplete information and multiple 
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banks. The equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined. They 
explore how the cross holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated 
regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious effects conditional on the failure of a 
financial institution. They show that contagious bank failure occurs with positive 
probability in the unique equilibrium of the economy, and demonstrate that the 
presence of such contagion risk can prevent banks from perfectly insuring each other 
against liquidity shocks via the cross-holding of deposits. 
Frankela et al (2008) study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary 
numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. They prove limit 
uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that 
survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme 
(1993) for two players, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may 
depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. They provide sufficient conditions 
on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection. 
Angeletos et al., (2007a) use coordination games of incomplete information to 
study the regime change. They extend the static benchmark examined in the literature 
by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying 
fundamentals over time. They first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the 
characterization of monotone equilibria. They then show how the interaction of the 
knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over 
time, or with changes in fundamentals, leads to interesting equilibrium properties. 
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First, multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information 
that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Second, fundamentals may predict 
the eventual regime outcome but not the timing or the number of attacks. Finally, 
equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquillity–where no attack is 
possible–and phases of distress–where a large attack can occur–even without changes 
in fundamentals  
Angeletos et al (2007b) studies defence policies in a global-game model of 
speculative currency attacks. Although the signalling role of policy interventions 
sustains multiple equilibria, a number of novel predictions emerge which are robust 
across all equilibria. (i) The central bank intervenes by raising domestic interest rates, 
or otherwise raising the cost of speculation, only when the value it assigns to 
defending the peg - its “type” is intermediate. (ii) Devaluation occurs only for low 
types. (iii) The set of types who intervene shrinks with the precision of market 
information. (iv) A unique equilibrium policy survives in the limit as the noise in 
market information vanishes, whereas the devaluation outcome remains indeterminate. 
(v) The payoff of the central bank is monotonic in its type. (vi) The option to 
intervene can be harmful only for sufficiently strong types; and when this happens, 
weak types are necessarily better off. While these predictions seem reasonable, none 
of them would have been possible in the common-knowledge version of the model. 
Combined, these results illustrate the broader methodological point of the paper: 
global games can retain significant selection power and deliver useful predictions 
even when the endogeneity of information sustains multiple equilibria.  
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Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2012) study a preemption game in which two potential 
competitors come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a 
competitor is revealed to her opponent only when the former moves, which terminates 
the game. They show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same 
distribution of players’ moving times, and the author explicitly construct such 
equilibrium. The intensity of competition is non-monotonic over time, and private 
information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. Our results have a natural interpretation 
in terms of eroding reputations.  
2.6. Summary 
Nature-inspired computational approaches are often viewed as global optimization 
methods, although convergence to a global optimum is only guaranteed in a weak 
probabilistic sense. However, one of the strengths of nature-inspired techniques is that 
they perform well on "noisy" functions where there may be multiple local optima. 
They tend not to get "stuck" on local minima and can often find globally optimal 
solutions.  
Evolutionary computing is becoming a successful methodology in approaching 
problems in the area of finance. It has already been proven to be a powerful tool in 
domains where more conventional analytical solutions may not be a good alternative. 
The choice of optimization techniques it offers have the advantages of speed of 
convergence, along with not getting easily stuck in local optima. Characteristics that 
answer well our criteria in choosing parameter exploration techniques for the hybrid 
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computational model. The author will particularly use genetic programming in 
developing the technical traders’ strategies in our multinational-market model. 
Swarm intelligence and artificial immune systems are relatively new nature-
inspired approaches, compared to evolutionary computing, but have been already 
widely used in a range of areas. Swarm intelligence is also being increasingly applied 
to problems in finance, while financial applications of artificial immune systems are 
still rare and the author are yet to see further development there. Our work is a step in 
that direction, and the author will implement an algorithm for optimising the 
parameters of the overall multiple-market model with its different types of traders, 
where the algorithm is a combination of SI and AIS techniques. Particularly, it is a 
particle swarm optimization with a clonal selection algorithm (Immune-PSO).  
Co-evolutionary algorithms (CoE), as an enhancement of nature-inspired 
algorithms, are a corollary of the fact that in complex domains it is difficult to assess 
an objective fitness measure for the problem. Co-evolution is also more realistic, 
reflecting similarity to real biological evolution. In CoE, fitness itself is a 
measurement of interacting individuals, which allows the potential for evolving 
greater complexity by allowing pieces of a problem to evolve in tandem. Thus, 
individual fitness is subjective, and is a function of its interaction with other 
individuals. For that reason, the author chooses to apply a co-evolutionary approach to 
the overall model and co-evolve the behaviours of different traders within the multi-
national markets. This leads to co-evolving the behaviours of the markets, which is 
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the more realistic option within the global financial system. 
Finally, Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions 
among economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) 
of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of 
the agents. It is easily understood and more suitable to be applied to our agent based 
model. 
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Chapter 3 : Measures of Interdependence for 
Random Variables 
3.1 Introduction 
Interdependence measures capture how two uncertain variables, e.g. two markets 
indices, are related to each other. In our agent-based model, described in details in 
Chapters 4 and 6, interdependence measures are used in the fitness function for the 
evolving model and its parameters. In this chapter, the author briefly discusses the 
correlation coefficient as a measure of interdependence between two random variables, 
and the limitations of this measure. Then, the author introduces the copula as an 
alternative measure, together with a discussion of types of copula and how their 
parameters are estimated. 
3.2 Interdependence 
3.2.1 Linear Correlation Coefficient 
The linear correlation coefficient (𝑟𝑟 ) between two random variables is a number 
between −1 and 1 which measures how close to a straight line a set of points falls in a 
plane, with the two coordinates of points given by corresponding realizations of two 
random variables. The closer to zero the correlation coefficient is, for a given set of 
points, the further away from a straight line they fall (hence the term "linear" 
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correlation coefficient)(Black, 2006).The sign and the absolute value of a correlation 
coefficient respectively describe the direction, and the magnitude of the relationship 
between two variables. 
 The greater the absolute value of a correlation coefficient, the stronger the 
linear relationship.  
 The strongest linear relationship is indicated by a correlation coefficient of -1 
or 1. 
 The weakest linear relationship or the luck of relationship is indicated by a 
correlation coefficient equal to 0.  
 A positive correlation means that if one variable gets larger, the other variable 
tends to get larger.  
 A negative correlation means that if one variable gets larger, the other variable 
tends to get smaller.  
The formula for linear correlation coefficient is 
𝜌𝜌(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) = 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 (𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌)
�𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 (𝑋𝑋)𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 (𝑌𝑌)    ,                   (3.1) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) is the co-variance of X, Y. 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟(𝑋𝑋) and 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟(𝑌𝑌) are the variances of 
X or Y, respectively.  
For random variables which are normally distributed, linear correlation 
completely characterizes the interdependence between them. However, the linear 
correlation coefficient is far less meaningful for non-normal distributions. 
Unfortunately, researchers find the data in the area of financial markets do not follow 
a normal distribution.  Given this limitation of the linear correlation coefficient, the 
 71 
 
rank correlation coefficient has been given more weight in the area of financial 
markets. 
3.2.2 Rank Correlation Coefficients 
In statistics, rank correlation is the study of relationships between different rankings 
on the same set of items. A rank correlation coefficient measures the correspondence 
between two rankings and assesses its significance. Two of the more popular rank 
correlation statistics are Kendall's tau rank correlation coefficient (Kendall's ℌ) and 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's 𝜌𝜌).  Rank correlation coefficient 
has at least four advantages.  First of all, it is less sensitive to bias due to the effect of 
outliers. Secondly, it can be used to reduce the weighting of outliers, as large distances 
get treated as a one-rank difference. Thirdly, it does not require an assumption of data 
being distributed normally. Lastly, when one or more outlier exist, it is advisable to 
study the rankings rather than the actual values (Asuero et al, 2006).  
3.2.2.1 Kendall's rank correlation coefficient 
In statistics, the Kendall rank correlation coefficient, commonly referred to as 
Kendall's tau (ℌ ) coefficient, is used to measure the association between two 
measured quantities. A tau test is a non-parametric hypothesis test which uses the 
coefficient to test for statistical dependence. Specifically, it is a measure of rank 
correlation: that is, the similarity of the orderings of the data when ranked by each of 
the quantities. It is named after Maurice Kendall, who developed it in Kendall (1938), 
though Gustav Fechner had proposed a similar measure in the context of time series in 
1897 (Kruskal, 1958). 
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Definition: Let (𝑥𝑥1,𝑦𝑦1), (𝑥𝑥2, 𝑦𝑦2), … , (𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 ,𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹) be a set of joint observations from two 
random variables 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 respectively. Any pair of observations (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) and (𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ) 
are said to be concordant if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗moves in the same direction, otherwise they 
are said to be discordant. (Nelsen, 2001) In other words, if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 > 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  and𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , or 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  and𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 < 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) and (𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ) are said to be concordant, otherwise 
discordant. The Kendall τ coefficient is defined as: 
ℌ = (𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 )−(𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 )12𝐹𝐹(𝐹𝐹−1)   .              (3.2) 
Properties: The denominator value is the total number of pairs, so the coefficient 
must be in the range −1≤ℌ≤1.  If the agreement between the two rankings is perfect, 
i.e. the two rankings are the same, the coefficient has value of 1.  
(a) If the divergence between the two rankings is perfect, i.e. one ranking is the 
reverse of the other, the coefficient has value of −1.  
(b) If X and Y are independent variables, then the author would expect the 
coefficient to be approximately zero.  
3.2.3 Copula - A General Measure of Interdependence 
A copula is a multivariate joint distribution defined on the 𝐹𝐹 -dimensional unit 
cube[0,1]𝐹𝐹 , such that every marginal distribution is uniform on the interval [0,1]. 
Specifically, 𝐶𝐶: [0,1]𝐹𝐹 → [0,1] is an 𝐹𝐹-dimensional copula, or briefly 𝐹𝐹-copula, if: 
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𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢) = 0 whenever 𝑢𝑢 ∈ [0,1]𝐹𝐹  has at least one component equal to 0; 
𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  whenever 𝑢𝑢 ∈ [0,1]𝐹𝐹  has all the components equal to 1 except the  
𝑖𝑖th one, which is equal to 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖; 
𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢) is 𝐹𝐹-increasing, for each hyper-rectangle 
𝐵𝐵 = �𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦� = �𝑥𝑥1,𝑦𝑦1� × �𝑥𝑥2,𝑦𝑦2� × ⋯�𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 ,𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹� ∈ [0,1]𝐹𝐹 .                      (3.3) 
3.2.3.1 Sklar's Theorem 
The theorem proposed by Sklar (1959) underlies most applications of the copula. 
Sklar's theorem states that given a joint distribution function 𝐻𝐻 for 𝑝𝑝 variables, and 
respective marginal distribution functions, there exists a copula 𝐶𝐶 such that the copula 
binds the margins to give the joint distribution. 
For the bivariate case, Sklar's theorem can be stated as follows. For any bivariate 
distribution function 𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) , let 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥,∞)  and 𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦) = 𝐻𝐻(∞,𝑦𝑦)  be the 
univariate marginal probability distribution functions. Then there exists a copula 𝐶𝐶 
such that 
𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥),𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦))  ,     (3.4) 
where the distribution 𝐶𝐶 is identified with its cumulative distribution function. If the 
marginal distributions 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) and 𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦) are continuous, the copula function 𝐶𝐶 is unique. 
Otherwise, the copula 𝐶𝐶 is unique on the range of values of the marginal distributions. 
Sklar's Theorem is very important because 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥),𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦) could be any distribution, 
and even if they are of different distribution, Sklar's Theorem still holds. That means 
the author can find a unique function to link two distribution functions. Further, this 
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function can be parameterized independently from the underlying univariate 
distributions. 
3.2.3.2 Copula Family 
A: Gaussian copula 
One example of a copula often used for modelling in finance as introduced by Li 
(2000) is the Gaussian copula, which is constructed from the bi-variate normal 
distribution via Sklar's theorem. With 𝛷𝛷𝜌𝜌  being the standard bivariate normal 
cumulative distribution function with correlation𝜌𝜌, the Gaussian copula function is 
𝐶𝐶𝜌𝜌 (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = 𝛷𝛷𝜌𝜌�𝛷𝛷−1(𝑢𝑢),𝛷𝛷−1(𝑣𝑣)�    ,                          (3.5) 
where 𝑢𝑢 , 𝑣𝑣 ∈ [0,1]  and 𝛷𝛷  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. 
Differentiating 𝐶𝐶 yields the copula density function: 
𝑐𝑐𝜌𝜌 (u,v)=
𝜑𝜑𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌𝜌𝜌 �𝛷𝛷
−1(𝑢𝑢),𝛷𝛷−1(𝑣𝑣)�
𝜑𝜑(𝛷𝛷−1(𝑢𝑢),𝛷𝛷−1(𝑣𝑣))      ,                          (3.6) 
where 
𝜑𝜑𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌𝜌𝜌 (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = 12𝜋𝜋�1−𝜌𝜌2 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �− 12(1−𝜌𝜌2) [𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑦𝑦2 − 2𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦]�                (3.7) 
is the density function for the standard bivariate Gaussian, φis the standard normal 
density. 
B. Archimedean copulas 
One particularly simple form of an 𝐹𝐹-dimensional copula is 
𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥1 ,𝑥𝑥2 ,𝑥𝑥3 , ⋯𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹� = 𝛹𝛹−1(∑ 𝛹𝛹(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)))  ,            (3.8) 
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where 𝛹𝛹 is known as a generator function. Such copulas are known as Archimedean. 
Any generator function which satisfies the properties below is a basis for a valid 
copula: 
𝛹𝛹(1) = 0 ;  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥→0 𝛹𝛹(𝑥𝑥) = ∞; 𝛹𝛹′(𝑥𝑥) < 0 ; 𝛹𝛹′′ (𝑥𝑥) > 0  .             (3.9) 
Archimedean copulas are an important family of copulas, which have a wide range of 
applications. There are a number of reasons for this. They are easy to construct, there 
is a great variety of copula families belonging to this class (Roger, 2006). 
Three common Archimedean copulas 
(i) Clayton copula(Nelsen,1999): 
𝐶𝐶𝜃𝜃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥⁡(�𝑥𝑥−𝜃𝜃 + 𝑦𝑦−𝜃𝜃 − 1�−1/𝜃𝜃 , 0) (3.10) 
and its generator is 𝛹𝛹𝜃𝜃(𝐹𝐹) = (𝐹𝐹−𝜃𝜃 − 1), where 𝜃𝜃 ∈ [−1,∞)\{0} 
For 𝜃𝜃 = 0 in the Clayton copula, the random variables are statistically independent. 
The generator function approach can be extended to create multivariate copulas, by 
simply including more additive terms. 
(ii) Gumbel copula(Nelsen,1999):: 
⁡𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝�−[(−𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥)𝛼𝛼 + (−𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦)𝛼𝛼 ]1/𝛼𝛼�       (3.11) 
and its generator is: 
𝛹𝛹𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹) = (−𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹⁡(𝐹𝐹))𝛼𝛼 , where𝛼𝛼 ∈ [1,∞) 
(iii) Frank copula(Nelsen,1999): 
𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = − 1𝛼𝛼 𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹 �1 + (𝐹𝐹−𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 −1)(𝐹𝐹−𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 −1)𝐹𝐹−𝛼𝛼−1 �                                            (3.12) 
and its generator is: 
𝛹𝛹𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹) = −𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹⁡(𝐹𝐹−𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 −1𝐹𝐹−𝛼𝛼−1 ),where 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [−∞,∞)\{0} 
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3.3. GARCH Model and Clayton-Copula for Return Simulation 
3.3.1 Selecting the Copula Function 
In our agent-based model, an interdependence measure is used in the fitness function, 
which further contains a group of parameters to be optimized. Previous models for 
contagion simulation use the linear correlation coefficient in the optimisation criterion. 
Given the limitation of that measure of interdependence, as described earlier in this 
chapter, the use of a copula function is suggested here. Copulas are becoming popular 
in the area of financial mathematics, overall.  Given two random variables 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, with 
univariate distributions 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥,𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦, suppose that a joint distribution 𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)also exists. 
Then there exists a copula, which maps the pair (𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥,𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦) into𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦). Crucially, such 
function can be parameterized independently from the underlying univariate 
distributions. Different choices of copula functions focus on different aspects of 
interdependence (Nelsen, 1999; Cherubini, 2004). 
In this work, the author use the Clayton copula to model the interdependence 
between two markets, as the author focus on the left tail risk. One of the qualities of 
the Clayton copula consists of capturing well tail dependence. The Clayton copula is 
defined in equation (3.11)  
3.3.2 Calculating Tail Dependence 
Tail dependence describes the conditional probability that one margin exceeds a 
certain threshold given that the other margin has already exceeded that threshold. Let 
𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌  be random variables with distribution functions 𝐹𝐹and𝐺𝐺 , respectively. The 
upper tail dependence parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑈𝑈  is the limit, if it exists, of the conditional 
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probability that 𝑌𝑌 is greater than the 100𝜁𝜁-th percentile of 𝐺𝐺 given that 𝑋𝑋 is greater 
than the 100𝜁𝜁-th percentile of 𝐹𝐹 as the parameter 𝜁𝜁 approaches 1 (Bickel et al., 2006). 
Therefore, 
𝜆𝜆𝑈𝑈 =  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝜁𝜁→1− 𝑆𝑆[𝑌𝑌 > 𝐺𝐺−1(𝜁𝜁) | 𝑋𝑋 > 𝐹𝐹−1(𝜁𝜁)]  .              (3.13a) 
Similarly, the lower tail dependence parameter 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿  is the limit, if it exists, of the 
conditional probability that 𝑌𝑌 is less than or equal to the 100𝜁𝜁-th percentile of 𝐺𝐺 given 
that 𝑋𝑋 is less than or equal to the 100𝜁𝜁-th percentile of 𝐹𝐹 as 𝜁𝜁 approaches 0: 
𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 =  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝜁𝜁→1− 𝑆𝑆[𝑌𝑌 ≤ 𝐺𝐺−1(𝜁𝜁) | 𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝐹𝐹−1(𝜁𝜁)]   .              (3.13b) 
The author are interested in the lower tail dependence coefficient of the Clayton 
copula, in particular. According to Nelsen (1999) it is evaluated as: 
𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 = 2−1𝜃𝜃     .           (3.14) 
Furthermore, there is a relationship between parameter 𝜃𝜃 from the Clayton copula and 
the Kendal ℌ  coefficient, and therefore between tail depencence and ℌ . The 
relationship is in the following form: 
𝜃𝜃 = 2ℌ1−ℌ      ,                             (3.15a) 
𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 = 2ℌ−12ℌ       .                      (3.15b) 
Therefore, in order to use tail dependence as a risk-relevant measure of 
interdependence between financial market series, the author need to evaluate 
parameter 𝜃𝜃 of the Clayton copula, and it is possible to do that by first calculating 
Kendal’s ℌ . As defined in formula 
(3.2), ℌ = (𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 )−(𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 )12𝐹𝐹(𝐹𝐹−1) , where any pair of 
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observations (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖),(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ) is concordant if (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 )(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ) > 0 while otherwise 
pairs are discordant. Furthermore, to be able to link ℌ to 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹  in formula 
(3.15a, b), the observations (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) should be drawn from uniform distributions. Thus 
it is necessary to transform first the raw data, which may come from different 
underlying distributions. The author next applies CARCH modelling to transform the 
return series data. 
3.3.3 Mapping to Uniform Distribution 
A large number of references (e.g. Engel, 1982) reveal that Generalized Auto-
Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models can successfully capture 
market dynamics and volatility. Here, the author chooses GARCH (1,1) to model 
both the return data series in the domestic market and in the foreign market. Let us 
consider normal GARCH (1,1) model: 
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹  (3.16a) 
𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹 = 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹  , 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹 ∽ 𝑁𝑁(0,1)               (3.16b) 
𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹−12 + 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹−12    ,       (3.16c) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹  models the real return series𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 , 𝜇𝜇 is the mean value of 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 , 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹  is the standard 
deviation, and 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹  is a random variable with standard normal distribution, while 
𝛼𝛼0,𝛼𝛼1,𝛽𝛽  are model parameters. (Bollerslev, 1986) The returns are modelled as 
conditionally normal, and a maximum likelihood aproach can be used to evaluate the 
parameters. 
Next, the author transforms the stock return series 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 into the uniform distribution 
with the following formula: 
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹+1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹+1 − 𝜇𝜇 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1 − 𝜇𝜇) = 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹+1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1 − 𝜇𝜇) 
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=𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹+1 ∗ 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹+1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1 − 𝜇𝜇)=𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(�𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹2 + 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹2𝜀𝜀t+1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1 − 𝜇𝜇) 
=𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹+1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1−𝜇𝜇
�𝛼𝛼0+𝛼𝛼1𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹2 +𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹2� = 𝑁𝑁� 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹+1−𝜇𝜇�𝛼𝛼0+𝛼𝛼1𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹2 +𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹2�                , (3.17) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹  satisfies (3.16) above. Thus the author can uniquely map the real time series 
𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  to a time series that has uniform distribution and takes values between 0 and 1. 
Applying that mapping to two stock return series, the author then can estimate 
Kendal’s ℌ  with formula (3.2) where the pairs of 
observations�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 ,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �,�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 � are taken from the mapped series. Finally, 
Clayton copula’s parameter 𝜃𝜃 and the tail dependence 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹  are evaluated using 
formula (3.15). 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the author briefly discusses the correlation coefficient as a measure of 
interdependence between two random variables, and the limitations of this measure. 
Then, the author introduces the copula as an alternative. Specifically, the author 
choose the Clayton copula to model the interdependence between two markets, as the 
author focus on the left tail risk and one of the qualities of the Clayton copula consists 
of capturing well lower tail dependence. The author also introduce a GARCH (1, 1) 
approach to help to transform the share price series into uniform distribution which 
are used for estimating Kendal’s ℌ. Finally, Clayton copula’s parameter 𝜃𝜃 and the tail 
dependence 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 ,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹  are evaluated. The tail dependence will be used in the next 
chapter as the optimization criteria in the fitness function and will contribute as a 
more reliable measure of interdependence than the linear correlation coefficient. The 
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comprehensive model GARCH Clayton copula is the contribution of the author and 
the components GARCH (1, 1), and Clayton copula are developed by mathematicians 
before the author. 
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Chapter 4 : An Agent-Based Model of Financial 
Contagion 
4.1 Introduction 
A series of historical financial crises, such as Mexico in 1987, Asia in 1997, and 
Russia in 1998, all share a common feature – problems spread from one country to 
others. The spread is due to the cross-market linkages. If the cross-market linkages 
stay stable then the crises is transferred through interdependence, and the recovery 
follows the recovery of the underlying economic reason in the country of origin. 
When the cross-market linkages get destabilized due to the crisis, then the crisis starts 
“feeding on it self” and the recovery of the underlying economic reason is not 
sufficient to get control of the crisis; a more comprehensive strategy with international 
involvement is required. The second type of crisis exhibits the phenomenon called 
‘financial contagion’.  
There is no conclusive definition of the financial contagion phenomenon 
described above. Most research papers identify contagion by analyzing the change in 
the variance-covariance matrix during the period of market turmoil. King and 
Wadhwani (1990) first test the correlations between the US, UK and Japan, during the 
US stock market crash in 1987. Boyer (1997) finds significant increases in correlation 
during financial crises, and reinforces a technical definition of financial contagion as a 
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correlation breakdown during the crash period. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define 
financial contagion as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to 
a group of countries”. In their work, the term “interdependence” is used as the 
alternative to “contagion”. Interdependence leads to common price movements during 
periods both of stability and turmoil.  
In the past two decades, many studies (e.g. Kaminsky et at., 1998; Kaminsky 
1999) developed early warning systems focused on the origins of financial crisis 
rather than on financial contagion. Other works (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; 
Caporale et al., 2005) focused on studying contagion compared to interdependence. In 
this chapter, the author model and simulate the transmission of financial crises, 
through the behavior of market players and their various strategies, using an 
integrated approach that involves a mixed-game (Game), co-evolutionary genetic 
programming (GP), a multinational agent-based model, and Clayton Copula. Our 
multinational model is developed to suit analyzing financial contagion; it is composed 
of four types of traders - Technical-GP, Technical-Game, Herd and Noise traders. A 
Technical-GP trader is a trader who makes decisions based on the technical analysis 
of price charts. Technical-GP traders analyze price charts to develop theories about 
the direction in which the market is likely to move. Technical-GP traders are 
modelled in the artificial market here through co-evolutionary genetic programming. 
Technical-Game traders make decision based on their decision tables. Game theory is 
a branch of applied mathematics and economics. The so-called “minority game”, as a 
further development of game theory, is especially useful to simulate real financial 
markets (Lebaron, 2006). Herd traders, as important as Technical-GP and Technical-
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Game traders when describing market behaviour, are the ones who make buy and sell 
decisions following the prevailing behaviour, regardless of other factors and market 
fundamentals. Herd behaviour has been identified as a major factor behind contagion 
(Cont and Bouchaud, 2000). Finally, Noise traders are stock traders whose decisions 
to buy, sell, or hold are irrational and erratic: their presence in financial markets can 
cause prices and risk levels to diverge from expected levels even if all other traders 
are rational (De Long et al., 1990). 
In this chapter, the author develops a comprehensive model comprising the four 
types of traders: technical-GP, technical-Game, herd, and noise traders, respectively. 
Furthermore, the one-market model is extended to a two-market model, in order to 
explore how financial contagion happens, by observing the evolution of the 
interactions between the two markets.  
4.2 Price Formation and Assets Allocation 
Real financial markets are composed of different types of participants who interact 
through asset trading. A market player 𝑖𝑖 generally holds two types of assets: 
a risky asset, denoted by ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹); 
cash, denoted by 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹). 
The proportions of technical-GP, technical-Game, herd and noise traders, are denoted 
as 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆 ,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹 ,𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , respectively. The notation 𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹)  stands for the share 
price at time 𝐹𝐹. The initial conditions include 10 shares, £1000 each and £10,000 cash 
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available to each player. At any step in time, a trader buys or sells certain number of 
assets according to their own trading rules. 
The price formation mechanism that the author uses here is similar to the one 
used in Giardina and Bouchaud (2003). A player i, takes a decision 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹), at each time 
step, where a decision to buy is denoted with 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 1 , to sell with 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = −1, and 
to do nothing 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 0. Moreover, they will make a bid or offer of a fraction 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) of 
their current holdings, where 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑔𝑔
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹)
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 1
−𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = −10               𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 0
                                     (4.1) 
and 𝑔𝑔 denotes the fraction of the maximum change of an agent’s holdings. It is an 
important parameter related to the cautiousness of the agents. In a market with 
heterogeneous agents, 𝑔𝑔 should be deferent for each agent. However, to make the 
simulation simple, the author assumes all agents are risk neutral and all have the same 
cautiousness coefficient. Namely, 𝑔𝑔  is constant. 𝐵𝐵(𝐹𝐹)  stands for the aggregated 
volume of bids, and 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹) for the aggregated volume of offers. These functions are 
used to calculate the excess demand 𝐷𝐷(𝐹𝐹) = 𝐵𝐵(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹), and 𝐷𝐷(𝐹𝐹) is used in a price 
determination equation similar to the ones proposed in Cont (2003). Thus price is 
calculated with the following formula: 
𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹) = 𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹 − 1) + 𝐷𝐷(𝐹𝐹)/𝜆𝜆                                         (4.2) 
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where 𝜆𝜆 is an important parameter representing the market sensitivity to the order 
imbalance. 
The fraction of fulfilled orders is similar to the one introduced in Giardina and 
Bouchaud (2003). The total number of shares that can be bought at the new price is 
calculated as:  
𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹) = 𝐵𝐵(𝐹𝐹) 𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹−1)
𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹)    (4.3) 
From formula (4.3), the author can see that if price goes up at time point 𝐹𝐹, the actual 
number of shares that can be bought 𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹) is less than the original order B(𝐹𝐹), and vice 
versa. The fraction of fulfilled buy𝜎𝜎+ and sell orders 𝜎𝜎− can be described as follows: 
𝜎𝜎+ = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(1， 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹)𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹))   and𝜎𝜎− = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(1， 𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹)𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹))                       (4.4) 
If global amount of sell orders 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹) is bigger than the actual number of shares that 
can be bought 𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹), then the fulfilled buy orders are still 𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹), namely, the fraction of 
fulfilled buy 𝜎𝜎+ is 1. Similarly, if global amount of sell orders 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹) is smaller than the 
actual number of shares that can be bought 𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹), then only 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹) shares could be 
bought. That is to say, the fraction of fulfilled buy 𝜎𝜎+ is 𝑂𝑂(𝐹𝐹)𝐵𝐵(�𝐹𝐹). The same rule applies to 
the fraction of sell orders𝜎𝜎−. 
Having established this, the author can now calculate the amount of shares 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) 
that the agent 𝑖𝑖 will buy or sell,  
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𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎+ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹)𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 1
−𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎−ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = −10                    𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 0
         (4.5) 
Finally, the author can update the traders’ holdings of cash and the risky asset: 
ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹 − 1) + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹)                                   (4.6a) 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹) = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹 − 1) +  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹)𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹)                               (4.b) 
4.3 Single Market Model 
Noted above, in our model, the author classifies the market players into four 
categories: 
a) Noise traders: these make decisions to buy, sell or do nothing with different 
probabilities. These probabilities are different for each player and are randomly 
predefined at the beginning and remain constant during simulation. 
b) Herd traders: these tend to follow the trend of price movements, and the 
probability of a ‘hold’ transaction at time 𝐹𝐹 is denoted with 𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁  and calculated as 
follows: 
𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 (𝑖𝑖) = 11+𝑁𝑁|𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1|   ,                                           (4.7) 
where parameter 𝑁𝑁 controls the sensitivity to price change. This formula ensures that 
when the price movement 𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1is big, then the probability of holding a share is small 
and vice versa. 
The probability of a “buy” decision is correspondingly: 
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𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 (i)= (1- 𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 (i)) 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1)𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1)+𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(−𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1)     .                    (4.8) 
Here, 𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹  is the overall price change at time 𝐹𝐹. Correspondingly, the probability of a 
“sell” decision is: 
𝑝𝑝−1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 (𝑖𝑖)=1-𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 (𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 (𝑖𝑖)  (4.9) 
c) Technical-Game traders: in our model, these play a mixed game, which is to 
say that technical-Game traders are divided into two groups, one of which plays a 
minority game and the other play a majority game. Tanaka-Yamawaki and Tokuka 
(2006) propose a minority game, where traders take one of two possible actions: buy 
(1) or sell (0). If the minority side is defined to mean the decision made by a minority 
of traders, those who end up on the minority side win the game – the price will move 
in their favour. After each trade is executed, all the traders know, by the way the price 
has moved, whether the right choice would have been to buy or sell. Also in the 
model, all agents have their own decision table.  
In our model, the author add one more choice “hold” (do nothing) to the model, 
to make it more realistic. Now the buy, hold and sell decision are denoted by 1, 0 and 
−1,  respectively. 
Table 4-1: An exemplary decision table 
Historical 
string Strategy(1) Strategy(2) Strategy(3) 
-1,-1 +1 0 0 
-1,0 +1 +1 0 
-1,+1 0 -1 +1 
0,-1 0 0 0 
0, 0 -1 0 -1 
0,+1 +1 +1 -1 
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+1,-1 0 +1 -1 
+1,0 -1 +1 -1 
+1,+1 0 -1 0 
Elements of the decision table: 
 Memory size,  𝑚𝑚 
 Number of strategies, 𝑘𝑘, included in a decision table  
 Binary descriptions (−1 sell, 0 hold, 1 buy) 
 Huge pool (33𝑚𝑚 ) of possible strategies 
Table 4-1 gives an example of a decision table, with 𝑚𝑚 = 2, and 𝑘𝑘 = 3. There are 
𝐾𝐾 = 19,683  possible strategies for 𝑚𝑚 = 2 . The decision table of a single agent 
includes only a few strategies out of these, in our case 𝑘𝑘 = 3 strategies. The strategy 
table becomes a baseline for a trader to make decisions. For example, if the historical 
string “−1 − 1” happened, which means the correct decision for the past two trade 
days would have been “sell”, then strategy one recommends to choose 1 in the current 
period, which means “buy”, but strategy two recommends to hold choosing 0. To 
select a strategy and evolve decision tables after each trade, traders re-evaluate all 
strategies; increasing the score for each strategy that produced the right decision and 
reducing the score for the strategies that gave wrong decisions. During the next 
trading period, each trader makes decision following the strategy with the highest 
score that is available to him or her. Importantly, all the traders have their own 
decision tables, each trader works with different 𝑘𝑘 strategies out of the large strategy 
pool 𝐾𝐾. The example in Table 4-1 presents one particular trader. The score 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  for 
each strategy is calculated as follows: 
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𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝐹𝐹−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹    ,  𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 = � 1  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹0                   ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁
−1 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹     ,            (4.10) 
where 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹  is the decision made in time period 𝐹𝐹. 
d) Technical-GP traders (Martinez-Jaramillo and Tsang, 2009): technical-GP 
analysis is a key feature of our model. This group of traders presents the richest range 
of behaviours. Technical-GP traders use GP to develop trading rules, and each 
individual technical-GP trader is represented by a different decision tree. The basic 
elements of such decision trees are rules and forecast values. A single rule is made up 
with a combination of three technical indicators, one rational operator such as “greater 
than” or “less than or equal to”, and a real-value threshold. The three technical 
indicators are moving average (MA), trading breakout (TRB), and volatility (VOL). A 
single rule interacts with other rules in one decision tree through logical operators 
such as “or”, “and”, “not” and “if-then-else”, as shown in Figure 4-1 presenting an 
example of a decision tree. The root node is always an “if-then-else” node (ITE); an 
ITE node has two children, each of which could be either a decision node or another 
“if-then-else” node. The code following Figure 4-1 shows how the decision-rule logic 
is derived from the decision tree. 
For each technical GP player at time t, after the crossover and mutation of its 
group of decision trees, test its decision trees by comparing the right decisions with 
the decisions made by its decision trees from the start time to time t-1. Calculate the 
number of right decisions made by each tree and rank them by the fitness according to 
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the following contingent Table 4-2.The best tree will be selected and used to make 
decision at time t. 
 
Table 4-2: Contingent table 
 
 
RC is the fitness of each decision tree. 
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Figure 4-1: An exemplary decision tree 
 
In the above algorithm, parameters 𝑚𝑚, 𝑛𝑛, 𝑐𝑐 are different for each technical-GP trader, 
which allows for any trading preferences. The parameters are initially drawn 
randomly for each trader, from a standard normal distribution, and then remain 
constant during the evolution of the decision trees and the optimisation of the overall 
model. The technical indicators are calculated based on the periods 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 , 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 ,𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 , 
correspondingly, and based on the data used to evaluate the model. The Moving 
Average (MA) indicator is defined as: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 , 𝐹𝐹) = 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹)−1 𝐿𝐿 ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−𝑖𝑖)𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=11 
𝐿𝐿
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−𝑖𝑖)𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1     ,  (4.11a) 
the Trading Breakout (TRB) indicator is defined as: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 , 𝐹𝐹) = 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹)−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 ⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−1),⋯𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 ))𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 ⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−1),⋯𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 ))    ,   (4.11b) 
and the Volatility (VOL) indicator is defined as: 
𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 , 𝐹𝐹) = 𝜎𝜎(𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−1),⋯𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 )1 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹−𝑖𝑖)𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1    (4.11c) 
d.1) Co-evolutionary GP setup for technical-GP traders: the basic decision tree 
for a technical-GP trader is introduced above and the author can now build on this to a 
co-evolutionary nature following a “red queen” principle. The “red queen” principle 
was originally proposed by Leigh Van Valen (1973) as a metaphor of a co-
evolutionary arms race between species. The result is that inevitably, when competing 
for scarce resources, one party is going to end up the winner controlling the majority 
of those resources. In our setting, the red queen principle is applied in the form of “red 
queen retraining”, similar to Martinez-Jaramillo and Tsang (2009). When a trader’s 
wealth falls below the average wealth, he/she launches a GP mechanism to evolve the 
population of rules by retaining half of his/her current population and initializing the 
other half randomly. 
4.4 Traders in the Multinational Market Model 
The author considers a two-nation market for notational and computational simplicity. 
The results can be generalized to involve more than two countries. 
a) Noise traders in a multinational market model: within a single market, 
noise traders make decisions to buy, sell or do nothing, with different probabilities𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 ,
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝ℎ , respectively. The probabilities are predefined and remain constant during 
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the whole process of simulation. These settings remain generally the same in the 
multinational market model; however, the author now has noise traders associated 
with each of the markets. For example, 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 ,𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 , 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 , are the 
probabilities for noise traders’ decisions in market A. For market B, the corresponding 
probabilities are𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝐵𝐵. 
b) Herd traders in a multinational market model: in the multinational market 
model, herd traders summarize the latest price changes in all markets, and have a 
tendency to follow the overall market trend (price change) 𝜁𝜁 with sensitivity 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 . 
This means that herd traders in market 𝑀𝑀 will tend to follow the overall price change 
in all markets 𝜁𝜁 with sensitivity 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀  towards that change. For example, in the case of 
two markets, market A and market B, the probability 𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) at time t of herd 
traders in market A to make a buy (1) decision is given as follows: 
𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟d,𝑀𝑀(i)= 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 )𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 �+𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(−𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 )   ,                           (4.12a) 
𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 = 𝜁𝜁 ∗ 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 −𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹−2𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹−2𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =𝑀𝑀    .             (4.12b) 
Higher sensitivity will lead to a higher probability of following the overall price 
change. The probability to make a sell decision (−1) is 𝑝𝑝−1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = (1 − 𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)), 
if the author only consider buy and sell decisions (Caporale et al., 2009). However, in 
order to add one more strategy “hold”, the author have further introduced into the 
above formula, the probability of a hold strategy calculated as follows:  
𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 11+𝑁𝑁 |𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 |                                            (4.13) 
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by analogy with formula (4.7). The probability of a “buy” decision is revised then to: 
𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = (1 − 𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀) 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 )𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 �+𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(−𝜁𝜁𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 )    .                    (4.14) 
Correspondingly, the probability of a “sell” decision becomes: 
𝑝𝑝−1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(i)= 1- 𝑝𝑝0,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(i) -𝑝𝑝1,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)    .                     (4.15) 
c) Technical-Game players in a multinational market model: in order to 
simulate the linkage between two markets, the mixed-game-based players are 
extended by allowing players to make investment decisions based on information 
from both domestic and foreign markets, while investing in the domestic market 
(Caporale et al. 2009). The author again consider two markets, 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐵𝐵, where 𝑀𝑀 is 
the domestic market and 𝐵𝐵 is the foreign market. An agent 𝑖𝑖  (𝑖𝑖 = 1,⋯𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀) operating 
in market 𝑀𝑀, has a probability 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) of choosing an action at time 𝐹𝐹 based on the 
domestic market, described as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝⁡(𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 (i))
𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑀 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑀 (𝑖𝑖)�+𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ⁡(− 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 (𝑖𝑖))      ,       (4.16) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀  is a scale factor. Agents will take actions based on either the domestic 
or the foreign market. Thus the probability 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)   of an agent in market 𝑀𝑀 
choosing an action based on the foreign market is 1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖). Parameter 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) is 
updated after each period. If a decision based on the foreign market history loses the 
game, then 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 (𝑖𝑖) + 1. If the action based on the foreign market history 
wins the game, and the decision based on the domestic market history loses, then 
𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹−1𝑀𝑀 (𝑖𝑖) − 1. Therefore, if the decisions based on the domestic and foreign 
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markets are different, 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)  is updated (Caporale et al. 2009). By analogy, the 
probabilities and score update can be evaluated for the case when an agent 𝑖𝑖  (𝑖𝑖 =1,⋯𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵) operates in market 𝐵𝐵, and therefore market 𝐵𝐵 is his/her domestic market. 
Once a trader chooses a market to make a decision, for example, market 𝐵𝐵, he/she 
then makes the decision using the historical price of market 𝐵𝐵, and the decision table 
for market 𝐵𝐵. After the trade, he/she updates the score for each strategy in decision 
table 𝐵𝐵. 
Table 4-3: A trader’s decision table involving markets A and B 
Historical 
string 𝐹𝐹1𝑀𝑀  𝐹𝐹2𝑀𝑀  𝐹𝐹3𝑀𝑀  
 
𝐹𝐹1𝐵𝐵  𝐹𝐹2𝐵𝐵  𝐹𝐹3𝐵𝐵  
-1,-1 1 0 0 
 
0 1 1 
-1,0 1 1 0 
 
1 1 0 
-1,+1 0 -1 1 
 
1 1 1 
0,-1 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
0,0 -1 0 1 
 
1 0 1 
0,+1 1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 
+1,-1 0 1 1 
 
0 1 1 
+1,0 -1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 
+1,+1 0 -1 0 
 
0 1 0 
 
d) Technical-GP traders in a multinational market model: the process by 
which the technical-GP traders choose the market - domestic or foreign - on the 
information of which to base their decision to trade in the domestic market, is similar 
to the process followed by the technical-Game players. All Technical-GP players also 
co-evolve their decision trees. 
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4.5 Evaluating the Integrated Model 
 
Figure 4-2: Multinational agent-based model 
In the artificial multinational market, as pictured in Figure 4-2, each type of player 
makes decisions based on the information from all markets. For example, in market 𝑀𝑀, 
during each trade, after decisions are made, a new market price is calculated with the 
price formation formula. The price information of both markets, 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐵𝐵, becomes 
public information and each player re-evaluates their strategies. If a decision made 
based on market𝐵𝐵, a foreign market, is more accurate than that based on market 𝑀𝑀, the 
domestic market, the player will have a higher probability of choosing information 
from market 𝐵𝐵 to make a decision in the next trading period. The same rules apply to 
players in market𝐵𝐵.  
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4.5.1 Model Parameters 
The aim of our model is to simulate shifts from interdependence to contagion. In 
particular, the author target simulation of the effects of the 1997 regional crisis, 
originating in Thailand, on the South Korea’s market. To achieve this purpose, the 
author needs to optimize the parameters in the multiple-market model. The model is 
capable of simulating multiple markets. However, the author will now consider two 
markets and use the real time series for one of the markets to optimise the model 
parameters while simulating the second market. The second market is simulated in 
such way that the tail dependence between the simulated time series and the real time 
series from the first market，is as close as possible to the tail dependence between the 
real markets. Let us assume that the real market is B and the simulated market is 𝑀𝑀. 
The model parameters then include the proportions of each type of trader - 
technical-GP, technical-Game, herd, and noise traders - denoted as 
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆 ,   𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹 ,𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 ,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , correspondingly. The heterogeneous model’s parameters 
further include the sensitivity of market 𝑀𝑀 towards the order imbalance 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀  in the price 
formation formula (4.2), and 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 ,𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 , 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀  corresponding to the 
behaviour of noise traders in market𝑀𝑀, as well as the sensitivity 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀  in formula (4.12b) 
of herd traders in market 𝑀𝑀 towards the overall price change on both markets, and the 
scale factor 𝑁𝑁 in formula (4.13). The other parameters are the memory sizes 𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2for 
the strategies of minority and majority technical-Game players in market 𝑀𝑀 , the 
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number of strategies 𝑘𝑘1,𝑘𝑘2 included in a decision table of minority and majority Game 
players, the scale factor 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀  in formula (4.16) relevant to the choice of 
information market, the time periods 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ,𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 ,𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿  in calculating the technical 
indicators for GP traders in market 𝑀𝑀, and a scale factor 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀  corresponding to 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀  
but now relevant to the choice of information market by GP traders. The model 
parameters are summarised in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-4: Symbols and parameters in the artificial market simulating contagion 
Symbol Parameter 
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆  
 
 
Technical-GP traders proportion 
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹  Technical-Game traders proportion 
𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁  Herding traders proportion 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
 
 
Noise traders proportion 
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 Probability to buy for noise traders 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 Probability to sell 
𝑝𝑝ℎ
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀 Probability for hold 
𝑘𝑘1 strategies for a minority technical-Game player 
𝑘𝑘2 strategies for a majority technical-Game player 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  Time period for calculating the MA indicators  
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵  Time period for calculating the TRB indicators 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿  Time period for calculating the VOL indicators 
𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆
𝑀𝑀  Scale factor for Tech-GP market choosing 
𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑀  Scale factor for Tech-Game market choosing 
𝑚𝑚1 Memory size of minority Technical-Game players 
𝑚𝑚2 Memory size of majority Technical-Game players 
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 sensitivity to price change for herd traders 
𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀 sensitivity of the market, in price formation,   
 towards the order imbalance 
 
4.5.2 Parameter Optimisation 
In order to measure the performances of parameter configurations, the author compare 
the tail dependence between the two real markets, with the tail dependence generated 
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by the artificial financial market, i.e. the dependence between the simulated market 𝑀𝑀 
and real market 𝐵𝐵. The tail dependence coefficient, as introduced in Chapter 3, is 
based on the Clayton copula. The fitness function 𝑓𝑓 is then formulated in such way 
that the fitness of parameter configurations could improve between 0  and 1  , i.e. 
fitness of 0 to 100%.  
𝑓𝑓�𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 ,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 � = 110 ∑ �2 𝐹𝐹−�𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 ,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 −𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 ,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,𝑗𝑗 �
𝐹𝐹
−�𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 ,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 −𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 ,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹s𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,𝑗𝑗 �+1�10𝑗𝑗=1    ,        (4.17) 
where the left tail dependence between the real markets is denoted as 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 , while 
the tail dependence coefficients generated through simulations of the artfifcial market 
model is denoted as 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,𝑗𝑗 . At each step of the optimization procedure, the author 
run 10 simulations with the same set of parameters, i.e. (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,10) as indicated in 
formula (4.17). The average fitness over the 10 simulations is then assigned as the 
fitness of that parameter configuration. The author then modify the parameters, and 
re-evaluate the fitness function. The process stops if the fitness function approaches 1 
or the maximum number of iterations is reached. Next in Chapter 5, the author 
develops a hybrid evolutionary algorithm capable of optimizing the artificial financial 
market introduced here.  
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter the author develop an agent-based financial market model comprising 
four types of traders - technical-GP, technical-Game, herd and noise traders – who 
make buy, hold and sell decisions, based on different characterising strategies. The 
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developed model also represents multiple markets rather than a single market, in order 
to simulate how financial contagion happens and observe the evolution of interactions 
between markets. Several features of our model are expected to contribute to the 
capability of simulating real markets and even the complex phenomenon of contagion. 
First, the model involves agents with different type of behaviour, and even different 
strategies within the same type of behaviour, which provides for a richer, complex, 
and more realistic simulated system. Second, the strategies incorporate information 
from two (multiple) markets rather than a single market; thus the simulated market’s 
links emerge through the underlying behaviours of agents. Third, instead of following 
previous studies and using a linear measure of how markets are co-related with each 
other, the author introduce the non-linear Clayton copula function and the Clayton 
tail-dependence coefficient to measure non-linear interdependence between non-
normally distributed financial data. That measure captures more realistic cross-market 
links, and it is used in the fitness function for optimizing our model parameters. In the 
next chapter, the author will develop hybrid optimization techniques to explore the 
parameters used in our model. 
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Chapter 5 : Immune-Particle Swarm Optimization 
Algorithm 
The agent-based artificial market the author have introduced in the Chapter 4 involves 
different types of traders, information from more than one market, and a set of 
parameters to be optimised for the overall problem, while the technical traders also 
optimise their strategies. The complexity of the model requires developing an 
optimisation algorithm capable of handling the task and achieving good convergence. 
As the author discussed in Chapter 2, different optimization techniques have their 
advantages and disadvantages. The author propose here an Immune Particle Swarm 
Optimization (Immune-PSO) algorithm, which is combined with an Immune Clone 
Selection algorithm． Clone copy， clone hyper-mutation and clone selection 
operations are performed during the evolutionary steps of the model．  Cloning 
individual particles in proportion to their affinity can protect high fitness individuals 
and speed up convergence. Clone hyper-mutation provides a mechanism producing 
new particles and maintaining diversity．Clone selection, which selects the best 
individuals, avoids degenerating algorithm’s effectiveness． 
5.1 Immune-PSO 
During the PSO search process, if one particle finds a temporary best solution, all the 
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other particles will tend to draw close to it, thus causing the phenomenon of clustering, 
and leading to a decrease in the diversity of the population. If the temporary best 
solution is a local best solution, searching in other spaces becomes less possible, and 
premature convergence to local optima occurs.  The author introduce an immune 
clone algorithm which overcomes this drawback of the standard PSO algorithm.  
Figure 5-1 presents the flowchart of the Immune-PSO. First, a group of particles 
are initialized and the algorithm calculates the fitness of each particle, picking the best 
solution pbest of each individual as well as identifying the global best solution gbest. 
After that, the immune clonal algorithm runs. The author views the particles as 
antibodies and calculates their affinity. This is followed by clone copy, hyper-
mutation, and clone selection operations. Finally, the author updates the particles’ 
(antibodies) speed and position. If the results meet the terminal condition, the author 
displays the result and end processing.  
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Figure 5-1: Flowchart of Immune-PSO 
5.2 Implementation of the Immune-PSO Algorithm 
5.2.1 Calculating the Affinity of Particles 
Affinity is the criterion used to measure the goodness of each antibody in the 
population. If the author views particles as antibodies, then to calculate an antibodies’ 
affinity means to calculate a particles’ affinity. The affinity takes both the fitness and 
particle’s position into consideration, and its formula is as follows: 
𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1     ,                                  (5.1) 
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where 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  is the distance between particle i and the global best solution gbest  
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = �∑ �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 −𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 �2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1      .                           (5.2) 
Here, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗  are the position of particle 𝑖𝑖  and the global best particle in 
dimension 𝑗𝑗, correspondingly. The author can see from formula (5.2) that the closer 
the particle to global best, and the higher the fitness, the larger the affinity.  
5.2.2 Clone Copy 
The number of copies of each individual is calculated in proportion to its affinity. The 
number of copies of the 𝑖𝑖th individual is: 
𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖=1 � .𝑚𝑚   ,                                (5.3) 
where 𝑚𝑚 is the size of the population. The larger the affinity, the better the individual, 
and thus the more offspring it will clone. Therefore, the superior individual is 
preserved and propagated, and this accelerates the speed of convergence.   
5.2.3 Clone Hyper-mutation 
For each copy of an individual, a probability is assigned to determine whether to 
execute hyper-mutation. During the course of evolution, the diversity of the 
population will decrease rapidly, as all the particles gather around the best one. If the 
best solution is a local best solution, the result will converge to a local optimum. 
Hyper-mutation can help to avoid getting stuck on the local best value.  
Hyper-mutation, namely Gaussian Mutation (GM), together with Cauchy 
Mutation (CM) has already been successfully applied to Evolutionary algorithms 
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(e.g.Hinterding, 1996; Radha,et al., 2009). This chapter uses both approaches. GM is 
used for small length mutation; CM is used for large length mutation, and the decision 
on which one to choose depends on the individual’s fitness. GM helps to promote 
accuracy, and CM helps to avoid local best value.  
(1) Gaussian Mutation (GM(Hinterding, 1996)): following GM, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  will be 
replaced by𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑁𝑁(0,1)         ,                   (5.4) 
where 𝑁𝑁(0,1) is the standard normal distribution. 
(2) Cauchy Mutation (CM)( Radha,et al., 2009): Cauchy density function is 
defined as  
𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑦𝑦 (𝑥𝑥) = 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋(𝐹𝐹2+𝑥𝑥2)      ,              (5.5) 
where 𝐹𝐹 > 0 is a scale factor. Then, 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +  𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘     ,                     (5.6) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 is generated by Cauchy function, and 𝜌𝜌 is an adjusting factor. 
5.2.4 Clone Selection 
After clone copy, clone hyper-mutation is carried out, and the author then chooses the 
best individuals to constitute the next generation. The parent solutions, and the 
offspring solutions following copy and mutation, are both considered at the selection 
stage. Figure 5-2 presents the process, where 𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝2,…,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚  correspond to the parent 
population, and 𝑝𝑝1∗, 𝑝𝑝2∗,…,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚∗  present the new population. 
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Figure 5-2: Main operations of the clone selection algorithm 
 
5.3 Performance Assessment 
The author will test our algorithm on a set of benchmarks, including the following 
functions: Branin, Shekel’s Foxholes, Goldstein-Price, generalized Rosenbrock’s, 
Schwefel’s, and Six-Hump Camel-Back function. 
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5.3.1 Testing Functions 
（1）Branin Function 
 
Figure 5-3: Branin function 
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（2）Shekel’s Foxholes Function 
 
Figure 5-4: Shekel’s Foxholes function 
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（3）Goldstein-Price Function 
 
Figure 5-5: Goldstein-Price function 
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（4）Generalized Rosenbrock’s Function 
 
Figure 5-6: Generalized Rosenbrock’s function 
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（5）Schwefel’s function 
 
Figure 5-7: Schwefel’s function 
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（6）Six-Hump Camel-Back Function 
 
Figure 5-8: Six-Hump Camel-Back function 
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5.3.2 PSO compared to Immune-PSO 
Settings for a generic PSO 
 Learning factor c1=1.4962 
 Learning factor c2=1.4962 
 Maximum iteration time =1000;             
 Population size =40;                   
 Stopping criteria: eps=10^ (-6);            
Table 5-1: Performance of standard PSO 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.398 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
PSO 0.4 1.005 3 0 0.0001 -1.031 
MSE 4.00E-06 4.90E-05 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5-2 Performance of Immune-PSO 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
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Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
I-PSO 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0.0001 -1.031 
MSE 0 0 0 0 1E-08 0 
 
The author can see from the above comparison that our Immune-PSO outperforms the 
standard PSO in function Branin and Foxhole. The standard PSO gets stuck in the 
local optimum while our Immune PSO find out the global optimum solution 
successfully.  
5.3.3 Experiment setting for GA 
The author compares the performance of our Immune-PSO algorithm in the 
benchmark functions to that of the GA toolbox in MATLAB 7.8. In order to choose 
the best GA setting for the test functions, the author designed a procedure considering 
three key operators - mutation, crossover, selection – and their combinations. Detailed 
results for the 18 groups of settings are provided in the appendix. 
Mutation:  Gaussian mutation, uniform mutation, adapt feasible mutation 
Crossover: one point crossover, two point crossover, intermediate crossover 
Selection: stochastic universal selection, roulette wheel selection 
Table 5-3: Ranked performance for each group 
Group Number Running Time Error 
3 38.9627 0 
6 39.7517 0 
9 44.8487 0 
18 45.8885 0 
17 47.5795 1E-04 
15 43.3207 0.0001 
12 41.5987 0.0001 
8 47.009 0.0001 
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7 43.9643 0.0002 
16 48.0341 0.0005 
10 44.9437 1.0814 
1 51.2532 1.1941 
2 23.4252 21.6722 
4 37.8866 28.6966 
11 42.7292 29.3478 
13 50.4376 35.0674 
14 40.6572 90.8184 
5 39.4206 158.219 
 
The author has two criteria to measure the performance of an optimization technique, 
running time and accuracy. In order to find the best experiment setting, the author 
give priority to accuracy and the above table is sorted by accuracy in terms of 
absolute error. The running time corresponds to the total average running time for 
each test function. The author can see from the table that groups 3, 6,9,18 all perfectly 
captured the global optimum, but group 3 achieves this in minimum time (38.9627). 
The setting of group 3 will be used when comparing GA and Immune-PSO. 
Setting of group 3: 
Stochastic Universal Selection  
Gaussian Mutation  
Stall Generation Limit: 30  
Population Size: 1000  
Intermediate Crossover  
Table 5-4: Performance of Group 3 
Function Name Real Value Experiment Value Average Running Time Error 
Branin 0.3979 0.3979 6.869 0 
Foxhole 0.998 0.998 7.7103 0 
GoldsteinPrice 3 3 6.1596 0 
Rosenbrock 0 0 6.052 0 
Schwefel 0 0 5.9968 0 
SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.175 0 
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38.9627 0 
When the author compare the performance of each group of setting for an 
individual function, the author find that group 6(Stochastic Universal Selection, 
Uniform Mutation, Intermediate Crossover) is suitable for functionsBranin, 
Rosenbrock and SixHump while group 3 (Stochastic Universal Selection, Gaussian 
Mutation, Intermediate Crossover) is suitable for functions Foxhole, GoldsteinPrice 
and Schwefel. 
Table 5-5 is a summary of appendix B. It indicates that Stochastic Universal 
Selection and Intermediate Crossover can help improve the performance of GA, since 
they appear in groups 3, 6 and 9. Intermediate Crossover appears in all four best 
groups (3, 6, 9, and 18). 
Table 5-5: Best player for each testing function 
Function Group Number Running Time Error 
Branin 6 5.9438 0 
Foxhole 3 7.7103 0 
GoldsteinPrice 3 6.1596 0 
Rosenbrock 6 6.0184 0 
Schwefel 3 5.9968 0 
SixHump 6 6.1273 0 
 
5.3.4 Immune-PSO compared to GA 
Table 5-6: Performance of Immune-PSO (population size 10000) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
PSO 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
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MSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Running Time 84.352 110.856 90.358 96.658 88.534 107.851 
 
Table 5-7: Performance of Immune-PSO (populaion size 1000) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
PSO 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
MSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Running Time 7.615 8.964 7.113 7.542 7.634 6.997 
Table 5-8: Performance of Immune-PSO (population size 100) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
PSO 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
MSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Running Time 7.615 8.964 7.113 7.542 7.634 6.997 
Table 5-9: Performance of Immune-PSO (population size 10) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
PSO 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
MSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Running Time 5.615 6.644 6.128 7.542 5.654 6.319 
 
Table 5-10: Performance of GA (population size 10000) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
GA 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
MSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Running Time 78.869 70.7103 76.1596 76.852 75.9968 76.175 
Table 5-11: Performance of GA (population size 1000) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
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GA 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
MSE 0.0999824 136.24726 2.4542356 0.039442 2.131016 1E-08 
Running Time 7.653 8.124 6.587 7.845 8.457 6.954 
Table 5-12: Performance of GA (population size 100) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
GA 0.3979 1.992 3 0.0082 0 -1.0316 
MSE 0 0.988036 0 6.724E-05 0 3.6E-07 
Running Time 6.869 7.7103 6.1596 6.052 5.9968 6.175 
Table 5-13: Performance of GA (population size 10) 
Function Branin Foxhole GoldsteinPrice Rosenbrock Schwefel SixHump 
Actual 0.3979 0.998 3 0 0 -1.031 
GA 0.7141 12.6705 4.5666 0.1986 1.4598 -1.0311 
MSE 0.0999824 136.24726 2.4542356 0.039442 2.131016 1E-08 
Running Time 5.457 4.689 5.004 6.398 6.154 5.954 
 
Table 5-14: Summary of the performance of I-PSO with different Population size 
Population 10000 1000 100 10 
MSE 0 0 0 0 
Running Time 578.609 45.865 45.865 37.902 
Table 5-15: Summary of the performance of GA with different Population size 
Population 10000 1000 100 10 
MSE 0 0 0.9881036 140.97193 
Running Time 454.7627 45.62 38.9627 33.656 
 
All results in the tables are the average of 100 runs, for each test function. The true 
minimum value of each function is indicated in the first row. MSE stands for the mean 
squared error of the value obtained through each algorithm. When use GA on the 
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complex problem, GA is tuned. GA in matlab is by no means the original basic GA, it 
has been revised by thousands of people, and the author can guess from the size of 
GA toolbox that it is a hybrid algorithm to certain extent despite the fact that it still 
called GA. that is why it is no worse than our I-pso. As I calculated in the viva, it 
takes i-pso about four days to produce a result and about 3 days for i-pso with 
population size of 10. You may not surprise as your previous student takes several 
days to get a result and our model is more complex than that one. It takes 6-9 seconds 
for GA with a population size of 1000 to produce a result. Intuitively, this is 
incredible as the author assure it takes 100 times as long as a population size of 10. 
However, further experiment show that  it takes 70-90 seconds to produce a result 
with a population size of 10000 which takes  ten times as long as size of 1000. The 
conclusion got is there is a non-linear relationship between population and running 
time, so does the complexity of test function.  And there may be a joint effect of 
complexity and population size. That means it is possible that the running time will 
significantly increase when the population size is less 1000, say 100 or even less. 
Although the author cannot test the second assertion as it takes unreasonably lone 
time to test it (may be years), the author could still come to the conclusion that GA 
with population size of 1000 takes much longer and is not suitable for our model. 
5.3.5 Optimization of the Market Model 
Having tested the Immune-PSO on benchmark functions and confirmed its general 
performance, the author now apply the algorithm to the complex artificial market 
model. The optimisation is performed using real data for 222 trading days during the 
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Asian crisis of 1997, divided in equal trading periods around the crisis point. Table 5-
16 presents the optimum parameter configurations achieved through I-PSO. 
Table 5-16: Optimum parameter values for the simulation of South Korea’s market 
Symbol Represents 
Parameters, 
I-PSO 
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆 
 
 
Technical-GP traders proportion 0.14 
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹  Technical-Game traders proportion 0.34 
𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁  Herding traders proportion 0.32 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
 
 
Noise traders proportion 0.20 
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀  Probability to buy for noise traders 0.33 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀  Probability to sell for noise traders 0.29 
𝑝𝑝ℎ
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀  Probability for hold for noise traders 0.38 
𝑘𝑘1 strategies for a minority technical-Game player 30 
𝑘𝑘2 strategies for a majority technical-Game player 52 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  Time period for calculating the MA indicators  8 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵  Time period for calculating the TRB indicators 14 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿  Time period for calculating the VOL indicators 20 
𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆
𝑀𝑀  Scale factor for Tech-GP market choosing 24 
𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑀  Scale factor for Tech-Game market choosing 31 
𝑚𝑚1 Memory size of minority Technical-Game players 30 
𝑚𝑚2 Memory size of majority Technical-Game players 56 
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀  sensitivity to price change for herd traders 34 
𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀 
sensitivity of the market, in price formation, 
towards the order imbalance 
 
4.3 
Table 5-17 also presents the characteristics of the real and simulated South 
Korea’s index return distribution, as well as the real and simulated dependence with 
Thailand’s market. The dependence is measured through Kendal’s tau rather than the 
correlation coefficient, following the argument in Chapter 3 for better capturing 
market dependence.  
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Table 5-17: Real and simulated dependence between South Korea’s and Thailand’s 
Target Value Real  I-PSO 
Kurtosis of daily return distribution 3.08 7.54 
Volatility 63.7 47.6 
Kendal’s tau for the pre-crisis phase -0.4334  -0.2143 
Kendal’s tau during the crisis phase 0.7328 0.2314 
 
The real and simulated market indices of South Korea, along with the real Thai 
index, are compared in Figure 5-9. 
 
Figure 5-9: Immune-PSO - a comparison of the simulated and real market indices of 
South Korea and the real Thai index, from 25/02/1997 to 31/12/1997 
Analysing the chart, the author find that in the pre-crisis phase, the simulated index 
relatively well approximates the real time series. The pattern however differs in the 
crisis phase. An issue here may be that the model assumes that the number of each 
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type of traders remains the same throughout the experiment. This may not be the case. 
When a crisis happens, more and more rational traders become herd traders, e.g. sell 
all their shares to avoid loss and push the price further down.  
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the author have developed a sophisticated optimization technique, 
which is accurate on benchmark functions, and capable to approach the complex 
market model introduced in Chapter 4. The proposed technique is a hybrid algorithm, 
namely, an Immune Particle Swarm Optimization (Immune-PSO) algorithm，which 
includes Immune Clone Selection．Thus, clone copy，clone hyper-mutation and 
clone selection operations are performed during the evolutionary steps in optimising 
the model. Cloning individual particles in proportion to their affinity can protect high 
fitness individuals and speed up convergence. Clone hyper-mutation provides a new 
mechanism producing new particles and maintaining diversity．Clone selection, 
which selects the best individuals, can avoids degenerating algorithm’s effectiveness. 
The typical benchmark functions are performed and the result was compared with GA 
using MATLAB GA Toolbox with appropriate setting. The results indicate that our 
technique performs at least as good as GA, and can be a reliable technique for the 
optimization of the agent based model. The optimisation and simulation results, 
however, reveal that the agent model follows reasonably well the market in the pre-
crisis period, but fails to capture financial contagion during the crisis phase. The 
author consider as a reason that the number of each type of traders in the model never 
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change, which is not the case in reality. To address the issue, the author introduce a 
mechanism allowing that technical traders could change their status during the 
simulation experiment, and relate that model feature to the observation that when a 
crisis happens, more and more rational traders become herd traders. 
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Chapter 6 : Financial Contagion: A Propagation 
Mechanism 
6.1 Background of the Asian crisis of 1997 
There are two views towards the cause of the 1997 Asian crisis. One is that the 
panicand inadequate policy responses triggered a region-wide financial crisis and the 
economic disruption that followed (Sachs and Radelet, 1998).An alternative view is 
that weaknesses in the Asian financial systems were at the root of the crisis (e.g. 
Moreno, Pasadilla, and Remolona, 1998). Although the two implications vary greatly, 
the two views are not mutually exclusive. Both causes contributed to the crisis. 
The economic shocks affecting East Asia at the time were followed by "runs" on 
the financial systems and currencies. Even well-managed banks or financial 
intermediaries are vulnerable to panics, because they traditionally engage in maturity 
transformation. That is, banks accept deposits with short maturities (say, three months) 
to finance loans with longer maturities (say, a year or longer). Maturity transformation 
is beneficial because it can make more funds available to productive long-term 
investors than they would otherwise receive. Outside crisis periods, banks have no 
problem managing their portfolios to meet expected withdrawals. However, if all 
depositors in panic decided to withdraw their funds from a given bank at the same 
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time, the bank would not have enough liquid assets to meet its obligations, threatening 
the viability of an otherwise solvent financial institution. As pointed out by Radelet 
and Sachs (1998), East Asian financial institutions had incurred a significant amount 
of external liquid liabilities that were not entirely backed by liquid assets, making 
them vulnerable to panics. As a result of the maturity transformation, some otherwise 
solvent financial institutions may indeed have been rendered insolvent because they 
were unable to deal with the sudden interruption in the international flow of funds. 
As investors tested currency pegs and financial systems in the region, those 
economies with the most vulnerable financial sectors (Indonesia, South Korea, and 
Thailand) experienced the most severe crises. In contrast, economies with more robust 
and well-capitalized financial institutions (such as Singapore) did not experience 
similar disruptions, in spite of slowing economic activity and declining asset values. 
Firstly, financial intermediaries were not always free to use business criteria in 
allocating credit. In some cases, well-connected borrowers could not be refused credit; 
in others, poorly managed firms could obtain loans to meet some government policy 
objective. Hindsight reveals that the cumulative effect of such type of credit allocation 
can produce massive losses. Second, financial intermediaries or their owners were not 
expected to bear the full costs of failure, reducing the incentive to manage risk 
effectively. In particular, financial intermediaries were protected by implicit or 
explicit government guarantees against losses, because governments could not bear 
the costs of large shocks to the payments system (McKinnon and Pill, 1997). The 
importance of implicit government guarantees in the most affected economies was 
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highlighted by the generous support given to financial institutions experiencing 
difficulties. For example, in South Korea, the very high overall debt ratios of 
corporate conglomerates (400% or higher) suggested that these borrowers were 
ultimately counting on government support in case of adverse outcomes. That was 
confirmed by events in 1997, when the government encouraged banks to extend 
emergency loans to some troubled conglomerates which were having difficulties 
servicing their debts, and supplied special loans to weak banks. Those responses 
further weakened the financial position of lenders and contributed to the uncertainty 
that triggered the financial crisis towards the end of 1997.Since weaknesses in East 
Asian financial systems had existed for decades and were not unique to the region, 
why did Asia not experience crises of this magnitude before? Two explanations are 
likely. First, rapid growth disguised the extent of risky lending. For many years, such 
growth allowed financial policies shielding firms that incurred losses from the adverse 
effects of their decisions. However, such policies would make economies highly 
vulnerable during periods of uncertainty. Second, innovations in information and 
transactions technologies had linked those countries more closely to the world 
financial markets in the 1990s, thus increasing their vulnerability to changes in market 
sentiment. 
Closer integration with the world financial markets adds dimensions of 
vulnerability that are not present in a closed economy. In a closed economy, bad loans 
caused by risky lending may not lead to a run because depositors know that the 
government can supply enough liquidity to financial institutions to prevent any losses 
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to depositors. In an open economy, that same injection of liquidity can destabilize the 
exchange rate. As a result, during periods of uncertainty, runs or speculative attacks 
on a currency can be avoided only if the holders of domestic assets are assured that 
the government can meet the demand for foreign currency. Those East Asian 
economies where foreign exchange reserves were large relative to their short-term 
borrowing (Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan) were in a better position to provide 
such assurances than those economies where such reserves were relatively low (South 
Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand). 
6.2. Methodology 
6.2.1. Introduction 
During crisis periods, some of the technical traders in real markets would give up 
their original trading strategies and become herd traders. In this chapter the author 
develop further the artificial market introduced earlier into a co-evolutionary market 
model where technical traders can change their behaviour during crisis periods and 
make their decisions based on the latest market sentiment rather than their usual 
criteria. 
The strategy-changing process applied here is based on the reasoning in game 
theory, though the author does not formally apply game theory and consider this as a 
direction for future research. Let us consider the trading process just before the outset 
of a crisis, and compare it with the prisoner’s dilemma. If all traders maintain their 
approach to decision making and strategy choice, then they are all better off, and the 
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author will refer to this as the cooperative setting of the trading process. If all become 
herd traders then all are worse off and suffer larger losses, due to pushing the prices 
further down than they would have otherwise gone. The author will refer to that as the 
non-cooperative setting of the trading process. Nuances here are the mostly-
cooperative setting and the mostly non-cooperative setting. In the former, most traders 
maintain their approach to decision making and strategy choices; while in the latter, 
most traders follow the latest sentiment. A trader in the mostly non-cooperative setting 
is on average worse off than a trader in the mostly cooperative setting, again for the 
reason of pushing the prices further down though not to the limit. 
The author can see that in the 1997 Asian crisis, the market portfolio, as 
represented by the stock market index, lost almost 70% of its assets. The detail here is 
that a technical trader may not necessarily change his status and follow the market 
sentiment right after a shock. He would keep observing and only when the long term 
adverse price change exceeds what he can bear, then he may choose to give up his 
trading strategy and become a herd trader. As the number of herd traders increases, the 
depth of the crisis may worsen and affect the recovery. As the herd traders follow the 
downward trend in the market where the crisis originates, and as our model provides a 
mechanism linking with other markets and transferring the sentiment, the traders in 
linked markets are gradually conditioned in their activity by the crisis in the original 
market. Thus the downward trend spreads to linked markets, leading to a significant 
increase in the correlation coefficient between markets. This behaviour meets the 
definition given in Forbes and Rigobon(2002), and contributes to the mechanism 
causing financial contagion.  
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6.2.2A Co-evolutionary Mechanism 
The author define the probability of status change as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐ℎ(𝛸𝛸𝐹𝐹) = 11+𝐹𝐹𝛸𝛸𝐹𝐹      (6.1a) 
𝛸𝛸𝐹𝐹 = −𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 = −�𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹 + 𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 ,𝐹𝐹� + 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 (6.1b) 
𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑚𝑚1 (𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹  )    (6.2) 
𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 ,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑚𝑚2 (𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝r𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 ,𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 ,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹  )    (6.3) 
𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 − 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹t−1Domestic   (6.4) 
Δprice1,tForeign  =  pricetForeign − pricet−1Foreign   (6.5) 
Δpricem,tDomestic = � Δpricet−iDomesticm−1i=1 =                                                            
                                         = � �pricet−iDomestic − pricet−i−1Domestic �m−1i=1   (6.6) 
Δpricem ,tForeign = � Δpricet−iForeignm−1i=1 = 
= � �pricet−iForeign − pricet−i−1Foreign �m−1i=1  (6.7) 
 
Formulas (6.1), whereΧt  is the composite force of the resistance and price change 
(PC), meets two criteria:  
(a) When the overall price change (Δprice1,t + Δpricem,t ) is within limits, a 
trader has a high probability of his status or strategy-selection remaining 
unchanged.  
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(b) When the overall price change (Δprice1,t + Δpricem,t ) in absolute value is 
large enough to exceed the positive constant resistance, a trader has a high 
probability of changing his status to a herd trader. Here, the author particularly 
considers large negative price changes corresponding to a crisis period. 
In formulas (6.2) and (6.3),a1  and a2  are scale factors, Δprice1,t  is the last price 
change and  Δpricem ,t  is the long-term bias. A trader will factor in his previous 
memories, which will persist for a while, but gradually fade to be replaced by recent 
memories. In our model setting, some technical traders will change their behaviour 
under certain circumstances and join the troop of herd traders. Converting back to 
technical traders may require an external intervention. 
6.2.3. Summary 
To simplify the setup - financial contagion occurs when a crisis happens in a 
foreign market, which causes panic in the domestic market. Then traders start selling 
stocks to reduce their potential loss, which pushes the price down to levels that trigger 
a financial crisis in the domestic market. The model gives an initial insight into the 
financial contagion phenomenon.  
6.3 Results and Analysis 
The author start the optimization using as initial parameter configuration, the values 
obtained by the I-PSO in Chapter 5 and presented in Table 5-8. Then the author 
optimize further, introducing to the set of parameters a1 and a2 from formulas (6.2) 
and (6.3). Notice that now the proportions of different types of technical traders and 
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herd traders are not part of the parameter configuration, as they change throughout a 
simulation. The proportion of noise traders is still part of the sets of parameters, 
however. A constant resistance is allocated randomly, as an integer number between 0 and 100 , to each technical trader i . The new optimised set of parameters is 
presented in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: Optimum parameter values for the simulated South Korean market 
Symbol Represents 
Parameters, I-PSO NNoise  
 
 
Noise traders proportion 0.11  pbNoise ,A  Probability to buy for noise traders 0.33  psNoise ,A  Probability to sell for noise traders 0.26  phNoise ,A  Probability for hold for noise traders 0.30 k1 Strategies for a minority technical-Game player 28 k2 Strategies for a majority technical-Game player 49 LMA  Time period for calculating the MA indicators  7 LTRB  Time period for calculating the TRB indicators 15 LVOL  Time period for calculating the VOL indicators 22 
γGPA  Scale factor for Tech-GP market choosing 17 
γGameA  Scale factor for Tech-Game market choosing 24 m1 Memory size of minority Technical-Game players 24 m2 Memory size of majority Technical-Game players 51 
τA  Sensitivity to price change for herd traders 25 
λA  Sensitivity of the market, in price formation, towards the order imbalance  3.8 a1  Scale factor for short memory 31 a2  Scale factor for long memory 42 
 
Next, Figure 6-1 compares the real and simulated market indices of South Korea, 
using the optimum parameter configuration, along with the real Thai index. The 
characteristics of the real and simulated South Korea’s market are presented in Table 
6-2, where Kendal’s tau uniquely corresponds to Clayton copula’s tail dependence. 
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Figure 6-1: Co-evolutionary market - a comparison of the simulated and real market indices of 
South Korea and the real Thai index, from 25/02/1997 to 31/12/1997 
 
Table 6-2: Real and simulated dependence between South Korea’s and Thailand’s markets 
Target Value Real  I-PSO 
Kurtosis of daily return distribution 3.08 5.43 
Volatility 63.7 52.6 
Kendal’s tau for the pre-crisis phase -0.4334 -0.4133 
Kendal’s tau during the crisis phase 0.7328 0.6512 
The change is brought by the variable status of traders, which can be observed in 
Figures 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4. The status profiles for technical-GP traders, technical-Game 
traders, and herd traders are shown in Figure 6-2. Figure 6-3 is particularly focused on 
the daily increment of herd traders. Finally, Figure 6-4 presents the net order of the 
 130 
 
four types of traders, including noise traders. 
 
Figure 6-2: South Korea simulation: changes in trader status 
 
Figure 6-3: Daily increment of herd traders 
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Figure 6-4: Net order of the four types of traders 
The simulated price index now follows closer the real one, and the simulated 
dependence coefficient, in both pre-crisis and crisis period, approximates well the real 
dependence. Figure 6-3 further demonstrates the daily increase in herd traders. The 
author can see that the number of herd traders increases from about 1% to almost 
2.5%, 10 days before the crisis, then continues to almost 1% increase each day. Figure 
6-4 next shows the net orders, i.e. buy order less sell orders, for the four types of 
traders. Since the net order affects the market price in the model, the author can 
follow the trend of price change by observing the net order total across all traders. The 
net order total is represented with black stars in the graph. Initially, the market price is 
affected by the joint impact of all four types of traders. As the crisis progresses, the 
red line (herd traders) gets closer to the black star (net order total). Therefore, mostly 
herd traders’ behaviour contributes to market price levels during crisis, though a 
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significant number of other types of traders remain on the market.  
Finally, traders’ assets, whether noise, herd, technical-Game or technical-GP 
traders, all suffered a big loss. Total asset value decreased from 10,000 to 3,000, 
losing almost 70% percent of their value. Since the crisis originated in Thailand, the 
situation could be worse there. The above analysis reveals that herd traders are a 
factor in the mechanism of financial contagion. A question to raise here is as follows: 
since the crisis is caused by market conditions, mainly caused by international 
currency speculators, beyond the control of individual traders and even their 
governments, how then can the author recover or better still prevent the crisis from 
happening? This is a difficult issue, and requires the co-ordination in action and the 
shared responsibilities of governments.  
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6.4. Comparing the Results from I-PSO and GA 
 
Figure 6-5: GA for SK and Thailand 
 
Figure 6-6: I-PSO for SK and Thailand 
 
Table 6-3: Real and simulated dependence between Thailand and SK markets 
Target Value Real  I-PSO GA 
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Kurtosis of daily return distribution 3.08 7.54 8.9 
Volatility 63.7 47.6 35.6 
Kendal’s tau for the pre-crisis phase -0.4334  -0.2143 -02349 
Kendal’s tau during the crisis phase 0.7328 0.4714 0.4612 
The author can see from the results above that I-PSO is better overall. 
6.5 Simulated Prediction of Contagion from Thailand to South Korea  
As the main goal of this thesis is to model and predict financial contagion, the author 
optimize in the pre-crisis period using data from the domestic market (South Korea) 
and the crisis-origin foreign market (Thailand), and predict in the crisis period using 
data from the foreign market and predicting the affected domestic market.  
 
Figure 6-7:Pre-crisis period optimisation-simulation for SK and Thailand 
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Figure 6-8: Crisis period predictive-simulation for SK and Thailand 
Using the model parameters optimised during the pre-crisis period, the author 
simulate the post-crisis period, and can see from Figure 6-8above that the predictive 
simulation approaches the real contagion behaviour well. 
6.6. Application to the Russian crisis of 1998 
6.6.1. Background 
The financial crisis was caused by the high fixed exchange rates between the Ruble, 
the falling productivity and foreign currencies intervention as well as the chronic 
fiscal deficit. The economic cost of the World War One also contributed to the crisis. 
Russian economy showed some signs of improvement in the first half of 1997, 
however, soon after this, problems began to get serious gradually. Two external 
shocks, which were the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 and the following 
dropping demand (and as a result the price also dropped) for crude and non-ferrous 
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metals, had severely influences on Russian’s foreign (IMF, 2012). When the East 
Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997, prices of energy and metals, which were 
Russia's two most valuable sources of capital flows, plummeted. In view of the fragile 
economy in Russia, the rapid decline in the value of those two capital sources resulted 
in an economic chaos in the country where GDP per capita fell, unemployment soared,  
as well as global investors liquidate their assets in Russia. At the time, Russia 
employed a "floating peg" policy toward the Ruble, meaning that the Central Bank 
decided that at any given time the ruble-to-dollar exchange rates would stay within a 
particular range. If the Ruble threatened to devalue outside of that range or "band", 
the Central Bank would intervene by spending foreign reserves buying Rubles 
(Joseph, 2003) 
The Russian government has no ability to implement a coherent set of economic 
reforms has led to the falling confidence of investors and can be compared to the 
chain reaction severe erosion at the central bank. Investors sell the Rouble and 
Russia's assets (such as securities); it also brings pressure on the Ruble downward to 
flee market. Forcing central Banks to use foreign exchange reserves to defend 
Russia's currency, which in turn further blow to investor confidence, weaken the 
Ruble. It is estimated that between October 1, 1997 and August 17, 1998, the Central 
Bank spent approximately $27 billion of its U.S. dollar reserves in order to maintain 
the floating. 
The Russian stock, bonds, and currency markets collapsed On August 13, 1998, 
as a result of investors fearing that the government would devalue the Ruble or default 
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on domestic debt, or both of the results. Annual production in the Ruble denominated 
bonds doubled. The stock market had to be closed for half an hour as prices 
plummeted. When this happened, it was down 65 percent with a small number of 
shares actually traded. From January to August 1998, the stock market had lost more 
than 75 percent of its value, 39 percent in the month of May alone. (Kotz, 1998) The 
nearby economies were also affected, including Ukraine, which we will use in the 
contagion simulation next. 
6.6.2. Results and Analysis 
Figure 6-7 compares the real and simulated market indices of Ukraine, using the 
optimum parameter configuration, along with the real Russian index. The 
characteristics of the real and simulated Ukraine’s market are presented in Table 6-5, 
where Kendal’s tau uniquely corresponds to Clayton copula’s tail dependence. 
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Figure 6-9: Co-evolutionary market - a comparison of the simulated and real market indices of 
Ukraine, along with the real Russian index, from 28/04/1997 to 04/09/1998 
 
Table 6-4: Optimum parameter values for the simulated Ukraine market 
Symbol Represents 
Parameters, I-PSO NNoise  
 
 
Noise traders proportion 0.12  pbNoise ,A  Probability to buy for noise traders 0.31  psNoise ,A  Probability to sell for noise traders 0.22  phNoise ,A  Probability for hold for noise traders 0.35 k1 Strategies for a minority technical-Game player 28 k2 Strategies for a majority technical-Game player 49 LMA  Time period for calculating the MA indicators  7 LTRB  Time period for calculating the TRB indicators 15 LVOL  Time period for calculating the VOL indicators 27 
γGPA  Scale factor for Tech-GP market choosing 17 
γGameA  Scale factor for Tech-Game market choosing 34 m1 Memory size of minority Technical-Game players 24 m2 Memory size of majority Technical-Game players 51 
τA  Sensitivity to price change for herd traders 22 
λA  Sensitivity of the market, in price formation, towards the order imbalance  4.1 a1  Scale factor for short memory 41 a2  Scale factor for long memory 42 
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Table 6-5: Real and simulated dependence between Ukraine’s and Russian’s markets 
Target Value Real  I-PSO 
Kurtosis of daily return distribution 3.98 4.23 
Volatility 43.7 58.6 
Kendal’s tau for the pre-crisis phase -0.3314 -0.4133 
Kendal’s tau during the crisis phase 0.7328 0.6322 
The change is brought by the variable status of traders, which can be observed in 
Figures 6-8, 6-9 and 6-10. The status profiles for technical-GP traders, technical-
Game traders, and herd traders are shown in Figure 6-8. Figure 6-9 is focused on the 
daily increment of herd traders. Figure 6-10 presents the net order of the four types of 
traders, including noise traders. 
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Figure 6-10: Ukraine simulation: changes in trader status 
 
Figure 6-11: Daily increment of herd traders 
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Figure 6-12: Net order of the four types of traders 
The simulated price index follows closely the real one, and the simulated dependence 
coefficient, in both pre-crisis and crisis period, approximates the real dependence.  
6.7. Simulated Prediction of Contagion from Russia to Ukraine 
 
Figure 6-13: Pre-crisis period optimisation-simulation for Russia and Ukraine 
 
The author optimize in the pre-crisis period using data from the domestic market 
(Ukraine) and the crisis-origin foreign market (Russia), and predict in the crisis period 
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using data from the foreign market and predicting the affected domestic market.  
 
 
Figure 6-14: Crisis period predictive-simulation for Russia and Ukraine 
 
Using the model parameters optimised during the pre-crisis period, the author 
simulate the post-crisis period, and as Figure 6-14 above shows, the simulated result 
captures the pattern of the real contagion behaviour relatively well. 
6.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, an overall mechanism is proposed of propagating crisis through 
contagion. Within that scope, a new co-evolutionary market model is discussed, where 
some of the technical traders change their behaviour during crisis and rather make 
their decisions based on market sentiment than on underlying strategies and factors. 
Thus psychological elements are contributed to the model. After analyzing the 
interactive behaviour of agents, the author observes that the herd mentality intensifies 
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during crisis. 
This chapter is focused on the transformation of market interdependence into 
contagion, and on the contagion effects. The author first build a multi-national 
platform to allow different type of players to trade implementing their own rules and 
considering information from the domestic and a foreign market. Traders’ strategies 
and the performance of the simulated domestic market is trained using historical 
prices on both markets, and optimizing artificial market’s parameters through 
immune-PSO techniques. The author also introduces psychological elements 
contributing to the transformation of technical into herd traders. A GARCH-copula is 
further applied to calculate the tail dependence between the affected market and the 
origin of the crisis, and that parameter is used in the fitness function for selecting the 
best solutions within the evolving population of possible model parameters, and 
therefore in the optimization criteria for contagion simulation. 
Our results show that the proportion of herd traders and their decisions increases 
in the net market order, for optimum contagion simulations. While technical traders 
‘trading behaviour corresponds to propagating a crisis through interdependence, herd 
behaviour corresponds to propagating through contagion. If contagion could be 
avoided or transformed back to interdependence with the effort of national 
governments and international bodies, a crisis would be more manageable. In that 
respect, a future focus of research would be to introduce a recovery mechanism into 
the model and modelling government and international intervention, so that the 
overall effect is either avoiding the transformation of interdependence into contagion 
or a recovery from contagion within a manageable time.  
 144 
 
Chapter 7 : Conclusions and Outlook 
7.1 Summary of Work 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a co-evolutionary artificial market, with the 
purpose of simulating financial contagion between markets, occurring during financial 
crises. Our work focuses on understanding the characteristics and warning signs of 
contagion, which will facilitate developing early warning systems. Such warning 
systems for contagion will help the authorities to implement appropriate management 
actions faster and therefore more effectively.  
The author develops an agent-based model for predictive simulation of financial 
contagion, and applies to two crisis cases. This approach can be next applied to 
current data rather than historic data, optimising the model up to the current time and 
then exploring different scenarios forward for the market the author consider as 
potential crisis origin, which will produce responding predictive simulation of the 
domestic market(s) that the author are concerned about being affected through 
contagion. Scenarios leading to contagion can be identified, as part of continuous 
monitoring for contagion. Therefore, our model acts as the first step in developing an 
early warning system for financial contagion.  
The way that different types of traders change their behaviour in the model in 
response to a crisis, allows us to gain an insight into the way contagion develops. The 
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author aims to simulate the spread of financial difficulties from the original market 
experiencing a crisis, to other markets outside the original crisis zone.  The author 
also aim to optimize the parameters in our model, so that characteristics of markets 
interactive behaviour are better captured. 
The contribution of the work has several aspects, both at level of developing the 
methodology and at level of empirical implementation. The author develop an 
artificial co-evolutionary international, instead of national, financial market. The 
author also suggests how the transfer mechanism operates to propagate the crisis 
through the market. The author introduces qualitatively different types of traders: 
technical-GP, technical-Game, herd and noise traders. Each technical-GP trader’s 
decision tree is evolved based on a technical analysis of market data. Each technical-
Game player has a distinct set of strategies, and re-evaluates their score according to 
their success on the market. Both types of technical traders may select to make a 
particular decision based on the information from the domestic or the foreign markets. 
Technical traders may further transform into herd traders. Each herd trader in a 
particular market has a propensity to follow the last market change in the interlinked 
markets. Each noise trader makes buy, hold or sell decisions randomly, without 
factoring in any market information  
The author also explores a more general mechanism to measure the 
interdependence between two markets and choose the Clayton copula function and 
tail-dependence coefficient. The author investigates the relation between the Claton 
copula’s tail-dependence coefficient and Kendal’s tau coefficient. Then the author use 
a GARCH model to map the index return time-series into a distribution allowing the 
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calculation of tau and thus of tail-dependence. Thus the author successfully captures 
dependence between markets and its changes from stable towards crisis periods.  
Next the author evaluates the artificial evolutionary international market to study 
the characteristics of financial contagion empirically. The model is estimated on real 
data for Thailand, where the Asian crisis of 1997 originated, and for South Korea, one 
of the most affected countries where the crisis transferred to. The objective is to 
simulate the movements of the South Korean market, in relation to the Thailand’s 
market. Before evaluating and running the simulation, the author begins by examining 
the available parameters. The dependence coefficient from the Clayton copula is 
further included in the formulation of the optimization criteria, i.e. the fitness function 
of the evolutionary optimisation technique. The author also applies the overall 
approach to the Russian crisis of 1998 and to modelling the contagion between the 
Russian and Ukrainian markets. 
The author developed a new hybrid optimization technique, namely immune 
particle swarm optimization (Immune-PSO), which maintains the good characteristics 
of both Immune clonal optimization and Particle Swarm Optimization while 
overcoming their drawbacks, and is capable of approaching the complexity of the 
model,. The author first benchmarks the Immune-PSO and then successfully applies it 
to optimise our model. The simulations reveal, however, that the results could be 
improved from that point on by modifying the model itself rather than by improving 
further the optimisation algorithm. A changing behaviour of traders during the crisis 
period is introduced, in order to reflect real market observations. Thus the overall 
mechanism of the co-evolutionary international market enables us to gain an insight to 
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the phenomenon of financial contagion. 
7.2 Contribution 
7.2.1 A GARCH-tau Approach to Clayton Tail Dependence 
The author briefly discusses the correlation coefficient as a measure of dependence 
between two random variables, and the limitations of this measure. Then, the author 
discusses different copula types and how their parameters are estimated. Finally, the 
author developed an approach to calculating the tail-dependence coefficient, as related 
to the Clayton copula function. The approach is based on estimating a GARCH model 
and then using it to map the time-series of the stock indices into distributions allowing 
the calculation of Kendal’s tau coefficient. Tau is then uniquely related to the left tail-
dependence coefficient of the Clayton copula function. Thus the author is able to 
better measure the interdependence between two markets. Tail-interdependence is also 
used in the formulation of the fitness function for our Immune-PSO optimization 
algorithm.  
7.2.2Immune Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
The author developed a new optimization technique, an Immune-PSO algorithm, 
which maintains the good characteristics of immune clonal optimization and particle 
swarm optimization. The author benchmarks the Immune-PSO algorithm against 
genetic algorithms, and then applies the Immune-PSO to estimate the artificial 
international market parameters based on empirical data for real markets. The Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998are selected as case studies. The 
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artificial international market is optimised and simulated, based on the data for 
Thailand as origin of a crisis and South Korea as an affected market. The results of the 
experiments indicate that the Immune-PSO is capable of optimising the model. They 
also indicate that the model can be further improved. 
7.2.3A Co-Evolutionary Artificial Financial Market Modelling Financial 
Contagion 
The author have already implemented in the model, a three-option mixed-game as an 
extension of the two option mixed-game for the technical-Game traders, as well 
technical-GP traders as a new type of traders evolving decision trees based on market 
performance. Next the author give a tentative explanation of factors contributing to 
the phenomenon of financial contagion allowing for changing traders’ behaviour from 
technical to herd traders. Thus the price is pushed even lower, leading to all traders 
being worse off. As the herd traders follow the downward trend in the market 
originating the crisis, the weighted sum of the price change in both that market and 
the trader’s domestic market conditions their trading in the domestic market. 
Gradually, the downward trend in the price series will spread to the domestic market 
and it will become affected by the crisis in the origin market, leading to a significant 
increase in the dependence between the two markets. This behaviour meets the 
definition given in Forbes (2002), and contributes to the circle that causes financial 
contagion. The author now optimises the model for two case studies, the Asian crisis 
of 1997 and then the Russian crisis. In the latter, Russia is the origin market in the 
contagion process and Ukraine is the affected market. 
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7.3 Risk Management Implications 
The financial crisis is a long-standing theme in the economic literature. The 
development of the world economy has been accompanied by financial crises, and 
they leave economists with unresolved questions.  
Financial contagion, as an extension of a financial crisis, has attracted more 
attention, ever since the global economic crisis, including the Asian financial crisis 
and its impact on many emerging markets (Claessens, 2000). Claessens and Forbes 
(2004) recommend improving national policies, market/investor strategies and the 
global financial regulatory framework to deal with possible future financial contagion. 
One motive for this thesis on contagion is to better understand how to reduce the 
impact of herding traders, particularly in a time of crisis. 
Despite there being a number of sophisticated methods for predicting future 
crises that have been developed in the recent literature, they focus on predicting the 
outbreak of a crisis rather than contagion, and a non-contagious crisis can be 
contained without the need for international intervention to mitigate risk. Secondly, 
whilst those models are based on factors which have been observed historically, more 
and more crises are now caused by factors which have not been significant in the past 
(Claessens and Forbes, 2004). Our co-evolutionary agent based model can be helpful, 
as part of an early warning system for financial contagion, in detecting contagion at 
an early stage, which will make crisis management more effective. 
In this thesis, the author develops a model capable of simulating financial 
contagion, and identifies its characteristics and parameters. The analysis of the results 
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of our model indicates that herding behaviour is a contributing factor to crisis 
transitions. Investors should improve their investment strategies through applying 
newly developed risk assessment models. It is also worth mentioning, however, as 
pointed out by Claessens and Forbes (2004), that when a number of institutions use 
similar models, the risk of contagion will be increased if these institutions all initiate 
similar behaviour after a crisis shock.   
Governments can also take effectives measure to halt a crisis. For example, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK acted to ban short-selling during the 
financial crisis of 2008. During the recent crisis, Pakistan has also imposed 
emergency stock limits to halt the slide, through narrowing the limit on losses from 5% 
to 1% and doubling the cap on gains to 10%, as of June 2008. These emergency 
policies limit the herding traders’ movements during the crisis period, and have 
appeared to be effective.  
In the model, the large price change factors as well as a sensitivity factor 
controlling to what extent herd traders are allowed to follow large price changes in 
foreign markets. One of the conclusions is that the focus should be on improving 
domestic policy first. Countries with effective macro-economic management, such as 
appropriate debt management, controllable exchange rates and strong financial 
systems are less affected by the knock-on effects from neighbouring countries’ trading, 
Claessens and Forbes (2004). A timely bailout plan by the government can also help 
improve the investor confidence in domestic markets, thus reducing the effects of the 
shock from other markets. For example, the Federal Reserve of the U.S. cut its 
benchmark interest rate from 5.25% to 1%, from 2006 to 2008, in an effort to halt the 
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worst crisis of the last decade.  
7.4 Outlook 
In this thesis the author has developed a co-evolutionary agent-based model with the 
purpose of simulating contagion occurring during financial crises. Although the 
author have investigated and simulated financial contagion, the author considers 
further directions of research. The technical-GP traders evolve their strategies, the 
technical-Game traders work with fixed decision tables -modelling an evolution of 
their strategies will further improve the realism of our artificial financial markets. 
Modelling agents with different levels of learning ability and memory window will 
also be more realistic. Introducing further game theory formally, with cooperative and 
non-cooperative games as different stages in crisis propagation can be another 
development. One more direction can be improving the optimization criterion used to 
measure the interdependence between two markets, rather than using a single-
parameter Clayton-copula. Finally, as our model is now focused on financial 
contagion, future work could go further and focus on the recovery mechanism that is 
to transform the contagion back into interdependence.  
The author believes that this work has contributed value to the analysis of the 
financial contagion phenomenon using agent-based simulation techniques. The 
investigation of market characteristics leading to financial contagion will contribute in 
future research to enabling regulators and other market analysts to recognise at an 
earlier stage an emerging financial crisis of the type that is only manageable through 
co-ordinated international effort. This information will be valuable for managers and 
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governments to launch effective risk management strategies.  
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Appendix 
A. Pseudo code for PSO 
 
A) For each particle  
     Initialize particle 
   End 
B) Do 
   a) For each particle  
        Calculate fitness value 
        If the fitness value is better than the 
           best fitness value pBest in history 
        Set the current value as the new pBest 
      End 
   b) For each particle  
        v[]=v[]+c1*rand()*(pbest[]-present[])+ 
                  +c2*rand()*(gbest[]-present[]) 
        present[]=present[]+v[] 
      End  
While the maximum iterations or minimum  
                  error criteria is not attained 
 
 
B. Pseudo code for an example decision tree 
1 If ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑚𝑚) AND (NOT (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵_𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵<b))) Then 
   2 Buy 
3 Else 
   4 If (𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿_𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐𝑐) Then 
      5 Sell 
   6 Else 
      7 Hold 
   8 End if 
9 End if 
C. Pseudo code for the agent based model. 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Initialize technical-game trader 
For i=1:num_technical_game 
[Decision_ table_game, score_table_game] =Initialize technical-game trader; 
End 
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Initialize technical-GP trader 
For i=1:n_technical 
[decision_tree_GP,score_table_GP] =Initialize technical GP trader; 
End 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
For t=start: 222 /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////Noise trader’s decision making 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////// prob_sell_noise, prob_hold_noise, prob_sell_noise are predefined 
For i=1:num_noise 
Probability=rand () 
If   0<probability <prob_buy_noise 
       Noise_deci(i)=1; 
  Else if prob_buy_noise<probability<prob_sell_noise+prob_hold_noise 
     Noise_deci(i)=0; 
  Else  
      Noise_deci(i)=-1; 
End 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////Herd trader’s decision making 
 
For i=1:num_herd 
Delta _A (t) =price_A (t)-price_A (t-1); 
    Delta _B (t) =price_B (t)-price_B (t-1); 
   Zeta (t) =sensitivity_factor_Herd*(Delta _A (t) +Delta _B (t)); 
Prob_hold_herd=1/ (1+d*zeta (t-1)); 
Prob_buy_herd=(1-prob_hold)*exp(zeta(t-1))/( exp(zeta(t-1))+ exp(-zeta(t-1))); 
Prob_sell_herd=1-prob_hold-prob_buy; 
Probability=rand () 
If   0<probability <prob_buy_herd 
       Herd_deci(i)=1; 
  Else if prob_buy_herd<probability<prob_sell_herd+prob_hold_herd 
  Herd_deci(i)=0; 
  Else  
      Herd_deci(i)=-1; 
End 
End  
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////Technical Game traders decision making 
For i=1:num_tech_Game 
   For j=start: t-1 
   game_Deci_ A(j)=decode_game(decision_table_A(i)); 
   game_Deci__B(j)=decode_game(decision_table_B(i)); 
   End  
Num_right_deci_A=count (find (deci_Game_A(i)==win));  // number of right decision using  A 
Num_right_deci_B=count (find (deci_Game_B(i)==win));  // number of right decision using  B 
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score_game_A=update_score_table(num_right_deci); 
score_game_B=update_score_table(num_right_deci); 
Best_ strategy_A =selection_Game(score _game_A); 
Best_ strategy_B =selection_Game(score_game_B)); 
(Market,Best_strategy)=market_selection_Game(score_market_A, score_market_B); ///select market 
Game_Deci (i) =decode (Best_ strategy) /////best strategy is of the selected market 
 End 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////technical GP traders decision making 
For i=1:num_tech_GP  
    If wealth_GP (i) <average_wealth //////red queen principal, re-initialize half of the population 
when////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////wealth fall below average 
       Population_GP (1:population_size_GP/2) =initiate_population_GP (population_size_GP/2); 
    End 
   Population_GP=crossover (population_GP); 
Population_GP=mutation (population_GP); 
For j=1: t-1 
     GP_deci(j)=decode_GP(population_GP);  
End 
Num_right_deci=count (find (GP_ deci (i)==win));  //calculate the number of right 
decision////////////////////////////////////////////////                       /for each decision tree  of player i up to time t; 
Fitness=num_right_deci/ (t-start);  
Best_tree=selection_GP (fitness); 
Market=market_selection_GP(score_GP_market_A, score_GP_market_B); ///select market 
GP_deci(i)=decode_GP(Best_tree, market_info(market)); ////////////decision of GP trader i at time t 
End 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// price formation 
Total_decision= [noise_deci,herd_deci,game_deci,GP_deci];  
 
      [num_Buy (t), num_Sell (t), num_Hold (t)]=classification (noise_deci,herd_deci,game_deci,GP_deci); 
      D (t) =sum (decision); 
      Price (t) =Price (t-1) +D (t)/lamna; 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Update wealth 
Num_Buy_new(t)=num_Buy(t)*Price(t-1)/Price(t); 
  tou_plus=min(1,O(t)/num_Buy_new(t)); 
  tou_minus=min(1,num_Buy_new(t)/O(t)); 
 
 
for i=1:total_players 
       if  total_decision(i)==1 
         rou(i,t)=g*tou_plus*cash(i,t)/Price(t); 
else if  
        total_decision(i)==-1 
         rou(i,t)=-g*tou_minus*num_shareholding(i,t); 
else  
         rou(i,t)=0; 
end  
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num_shareholding(i,t)= num_shareholding(i,t-1)+rou(i,t);  //////////// new number of  share holding 
cash(i,t)= cash(i,t-1)+ rou(i,t)*P(t);  ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////new cash holding 
end  
 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Update technical game traders 
Score _game_A =Update_game_score(score _game_A); 
Score _game_B =Update_game_score(score _game_B); 
Score _market_game_ A =Update_game_market_score(score_market _game_A); 
Score _market_game_ B =Update_game_market_score(score_market _game_B); 
 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////Update technical GP traders 
Score _market_GP_ A =Update_GP_market_score(score_market _GP_A); 
Score _market_GP_ B =Update_GP_market_score(score_market _GP_B); 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
End  
 
 
D. Pseudo code for the Immune-PSO Algorithm 
%------experiment setup---------------------------------------------- 
c1=1.4962;             %learning factor 1 
c2=1.4962;             %learning factor 2 
w=0.7298;              %inertia coefficient 
MaxDT=200;            %maximum iteration time 
D=14;                  %dimension 
N=10;                  %size of population 
eps=10^(-20);          %stopping criteria 
replaceP=0.6;          %replacement probability 
 
%------initialize individuals ------------ 
fori=1:N 
position (i)=Initialize_ position()   %%%% position(i) is a set of parameters to be optimized 
velocity(i)=Initialize_velocity() 
End 
 
%------calculate the fitness of each particle and initialize local_best(i)andpg (global best) - -- 
 
Fori=1:N 
fitness (i)=Fitness_function(position(i))%%%%%% see the pseudo code for artificial 
financial market 
local_best(i)=position(i); 
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End 
 
pg=position (1);             %set an initial value for pg 
 
Fori=2: N% find global best (pg) before iteration 
If Fitness_function(position(i))<Fitness_function(pg)    
pg=position (i); 
End 
End 
 
%------iterating till the stopping criteria met-------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
For t=1:MaxDT 
Fori=1:N 
Velocity (i) =update_velocity(position(i),local_best(i),pg) 
position (i)=position(i)+velocity (i); 
 
If Fitness_function(position(i))<fitness(i) 
fitness(i)=fitness_function(position(i)) 
local_best(i)=position(i); 
End 
 
If position (i)<Fitness_function(pg) 
pg=local_best(i); 
End 
Pbest(t)=Fitness_function(pg);    
 
  %-----------proceed immune process－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－ 
affinity=calc_affinicty(position,pg); 
position=clone_copy(affinity,N); 
position=hyper_mutaion(position); 
pg=selection (position); 
end 
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Stochastic Universal Selection 1 
   Gaussian Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Singlepoint Crossover 
    
  Function Name Real Value Experiment Value Average Running Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.4094 13.5018 0.0115 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 10.2794 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3.991 7.0003 0.991 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.1247 6.0908 0.1247 
 Schwefel 0 0.0637 7.1027 0.0637 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0284 7.2782 0.0032 
 
   
51.2532 1.1941 
 
      Stochastic Universal Selection 2 
   Gaussian Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Two point Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.4206 4.5658 0.0227 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.9989 4.3474 0.0009 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 24.3153 3.3358 21.3153 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.0362 3.7151 0.0362 
 Schwefel 0 0.274 4.2414 0.274 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0085 3.2197 0.0231 
 
   
23.4252 21.6722 
 
      
      
      Stochastic Universal Selection 3 
   Gaussian Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
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Intermediate Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 6.869 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 7.7103 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 6.1596 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 6.052 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 5.9968 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.175 0 
 
   
38.9627 0 
 
      
      
      Stochastic Universal Selection 4 
   Uniform Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Single point Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.4251 6.1832 0.0272 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 7.7954 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 31.2417 6.1035 28.2417 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.2564 5.8863 0.2564 
 Schwefel 0 0.0843 5.9127 0.0843 
 SixHump -1.0316 -0.9446 6.0055 0.087 
 
   
37.8866 28.6966 
 
      Stochastic Universal Selection 5 
   Uniform Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Two point Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment Value Average Running Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 1.1818 5.7984 0.7839 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.9981 7.879 1E-04 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 159.8011 6.2036 156.8011 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.5681 6.0293 0.5681 
 Schwefel 0 0.0345 6.3845 0.0345 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0002 7.1258 0.0314 
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39.4206 158.2191 
 
      
      
      Stochastic Universal Selection 6 
   Uniform Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Intermediate Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 5.9438 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 9.2044 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 6.2838 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 6.0184 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 6.174 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.1273 0 
 
   
39.7517 0 
 
      
      Stochastic Universal Selection 7 
   Adaptfeasible Mutation 
    Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Singlepoint Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 7.6899 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.355 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 6.7631 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 6.6196 0 
 Schwefel 0 0.0002 7.7884 0.0002 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.7483 0 
 
   
43.9643 0.0002 
 
      Stochastic Universal Selection 8 
   Adaptfeasible Mutation 
    Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Two point Crossover 
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Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 7.9577 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.6542 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3.0001 8.1191 0.0001 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 7.4651 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 7.4425 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 7.3704 0 
 
   
47.009 0.0001 
 
      
      
      Stochastic Universal Selection 9 
   Adaptfeasible Mutation 
    Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Intermediate Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 7.8308 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.6518 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 6.9837 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 7.3039 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 7.0849 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.9936 0 
 
   
44.8487 0 
 
      
      
      Roulette wheel selection 10 
   Gaussian Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Singlepoint Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.4074 5.7874 0.0095 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 7.7744 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3.1854 8.209 0.1854 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.8147 8.5425 0.8147 
 Schwefel 0 0.0717 7.2959 0.0717 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0315 7.3345 1E-04 
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44.9437 1.0814 
 
      Roulette wheel selection 11 
   Gaussian Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Two point Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.4179 6.9516 0.02 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.4479 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 32.0737 7.644 29.0737 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.1582 6.7657 0.1582 
 Schwefel 0 0.0798 6.3911 0.0798 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0155 6.5289 0.0161 
 
   
42.7292 29.3478 
 
      
      
      Roulette wheel selection 12 
   Gaussian Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Intermediate Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 7.8637 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 7.7567 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3.0001 6.8385 0.0001 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 6.3034 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 6.3741 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.4623 0 
 
   
41.5987 0.0001 
 
      
      
      
      
      
      Roulette wheel selection 13 
   Uniform Mutation 
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Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Singlepoint Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.4003 15.8717 0.0024 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.8605 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 35.916 6.55 32.916 
 Rosenbrock 0 1.4017 6.6019 1.4017 
 Schwefel 0 0.3211 6.2275 0.3211 
 SixHump -1.0316 -0.6054 6.326 0.4262 
 
   
50.4376 35.0674 
 
      Roulette wheel selection 14 
   Uniform Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Two point Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.5749 7.763 0.177 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.999 7.8761 0.001 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 27.3964 6.1809 24.3964 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.3451 6.1584 0.3451 
 Schwefel 0 0.3202 6.061 0.3202 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0307 6.2889 0.0009 
 
   
40.3283 25.2406 
 
      
      
      Roulette wheel selection 15 
   Uniform Mutation 
     Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Intermediate Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 6.6773 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 9.3039 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 6.9817 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.0001 6.7345 0.0001 
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Schwefel 0 0 6.8726 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 6.7507 0 
 
   
43.3207 0.0001 
 
      
      
      
      
      Roulette wheel selection 16 
   Adaptfeasible Mutation 
    Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Singlepoint Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 8.5209 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.9883 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 7.5996 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0.0001 8.5714 0.0001 
 Schwefel 0 0.0004 7.277 0.0004 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 7.0769 0 
 
   
48.0341 0.0005 
 
      Roulette wheel selection 17 
   Adaptfeasible Mutation 
    Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Two point Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 7.8842 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.6778 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 7.2064 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 7.3806 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 8.6659 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0315 7.7646 1E-04 
 
   
47.5795 1E-04 
 
      
      
      Roulette wheel selection 18 
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Adaptfeasible Mutation 
    Stall Generation Limit:30 
    Population Size:1000 
    Intermediate Crossover 
    
      Function Name Real Value Experiment  Value Average Running  Time Error 
 Branin 0.3979 0.3979 7.8381 0 
 Foxhole 0.998 0.998 8.747 0 
 GoldsteinPrice 3 3 7.4614 0 
 Rosenbrock 0 0 7.2425 0 
 Schwefel 0 0 7.2607 0 
 SixHump -1.0316 -1.0316 7.3388 0 
 
   
45.8885 0 
  
 
 
Branin 
 Group Number Running Time Error 
3 6.869 0 
6 5.9438 0 
7 7.6899 0 
8 7.9577 0 
9 7.8308 0 
12 7.8637 0 
15 6.6773 0 
16 8.5209 0 
17 7.8842 0 
18 7.8381 0 
13 15.8717 0.0024 
10 5.7874 0.0095 
1 13.5018 0.0115 
11 6.9516 0.02 
2 4.5658 0.0227 
4 6.1832 0.0272 
14 7.763 0.177 
5 5.7984 0.7839 
 
 
 
Foxhole 
 Group Number Running Time Error 
2 4.5658 0.0227 
3 7.7103 0 
12 7.7567 0 
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10 7.7744 0 
4 7.7954 0 
14 7.8761 0.001 
5 7.879 1.00E-04 
7 8.355 0 
11 8.4479 0 
9 8.6518 0 
8 8.6542 0 
17 8.6778 0 
18 8.747 0 
13 8.8605 0 
16 8.9883 0 
6 9.2044 0 
15 9.3039 0 
1 10.2794 0 
 
 
 
 
 
Goldstein Price 
 Group Number Running Time Error 
3 6.1596 0 
6 6.2838 0 
7 6.7631 0 
9 6.9837 0 
15 6.9817 0 
16 7.5996 0 
17 7.2064 0 
18 7.4614 0 
8 8.1191 0.0001 
12 6.8385 0.0001 
10 8.209 0.1854 
1 7.0003 0.991 
2 3.3358 21.3153 
14 6.1809 24.3964 
4 6.1035 28.2417 
11 7.644 29.0737 
13 6.55 32.916 
5 6.2036 156.8011 
 
 
 
Rosenbrock 
 Group Number Running Time Error 
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3 6.052 0 
6 6.0184 0 
7 6.6196 0 
8 7.4651 0 
9 7.3039 0 
12 6.3034 0 
17 7.3806 0 
18 7.2425 0 
15 6.7345 0.0001 
16 8.5714 0.0001 
2 3.7151 0.0362 
1 6.0908 0.1247 
11 6.7657 0.1582 
4 5.8863 0.2564 
14 6.1584 0.3451 
5 6.0293 0.5681 
10 8.5425 0.8147 
13 6.6019 1.4017 
 
 
 
Schwefel 
 Group Number Running Time Error 
3 5.9968 0 
6 6.174 0 
8 7.4425 0 
9 7.0849 0 
12 6.3741 0 
15 6.8726 0 
17 8.6659 0 
18 7.2607 0 
7 7.7884 0.0002 
16 7.277 0.0004 
5 6.3845 0.0345 
1 7.1027 0.0637 
10 7.2959 0.0717 
11 6.3911 0.0798 
4 5.9127 0.0843 
2 4.2414 0.274 
14 6.061 0.3202 
13 6.2275 0.3211 
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SixHump 
 Group Number Running Time Error 
3 6.175 0 
6 6.1273 0 
7 6.7483 0 
8 7.3704 0 
9 6.9936 0 
12 6.4623 0 
15 6.7507 0 
16 7.0769 0 
18 7.3388 0 
10 7.3345 1.00E-04 
17 7.7646 1.00E-04 
14 6.2889 0.0009 
1 7.2782 0.0032 
11 6.5289 0.0161 
2 3.2197 0.0231 
5 7.1258 0.0314 
4 6.0055 0.087 
13 6.326 0.4262 
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